JUN 2 2 '60
DUPLICATE

Christianity and Society

Power and World Organization
Carl Mayer

Reflections on the Incarnation
Clifford Stanley

The British Political and Religious Situation
Alan Richardson

Obedience and Justice
Paul Lehmann

HOLBROOK LIBRARY
PACIFIC SCHOOL
OF RELIGION

v. 8-9
autumn 1944

WINTER 1942 — **25 CENTS**

Volume 8 Winter 1942 Number 1

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction
PUBLISHED BY THE FELLOWSHIP OF SOCIALIST CHRISTIANS

WINTER MEETING OF THE FELLOWSHIP

The annual winter meeting of the Fellowship will be held at the Riverside Church, New York City, on Thursday, January 28th. The day's program is as follows:

10:30 Presentation of new statement of principles for the Fellowship by Prof. A. T. Mollegan. Discussion of the Fellowship's platform and program.
12:30 Luncheon.
3:30 "The Problem of Freedom and Planning in the Nation after the War." Discussion opened by Prof. Oscar Lange of the University of Chicago.
5:45 Worship Service.
6:30 Tenth Anniversary Dinner of the Fellowship. History of the Fellowship by Winnifred Wygal. Remarks by Norman Sibley and Reinhold Niebuhr.
8:15 "The Problem of Freedom and Organization in International Affairs." Discussion opened by Prof. Hans Simons of the New School.

(Please make reservations for the anniversary dinner.)

EDITOR
REINHOLD NIEBUHR

EDITORIAL BOARD
EDUARD HEIMANN CLIFFORD STANLEY RICHARD DAY A. T. MOLLEGEN
WINNIFRED WYGAL HARRY BONE ROSE TERLIN ARNOLD NASH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FELLOWSHIP OF SOCIALIST CHRISTIANS
NORMAN SIBLEY EDUARD HEIMANN RICHARD DAY WINNIFRED WYGAL
HERMAN REISSIG REINHOLD NIEBUHR HERBERT KING
DOROTHY FOSDICK JOHN DANIELS B. APELIAN

Subscription Rate: $1.00 per year; 25c per copy
4 Shillings per year in England
Published Quarterly

Business Address: 3041 Broadway, N. Y. C.
English Agent: Alan Richardson, Annandale, North End Road, London N. W. 11.

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

VOLUME 8 NUMBER 1

EDITORIALS

Military Victory and Political Defeat.

The invasion of Africa has made victory for the United Nations a real, though not an imminent possibility. We now know that victory is practically certain, though the way to it may still be strait and narrow. The tide has definitely turned. But with the turning of the tide of military fortune we suddenly confront the specter of political defeat. Evidence multiplies that strong forces within the United Nations, more particularly in our own country, are contemplating a conservative reconstruction of Europe which is almost certain to drive the harassed peoples of Europe into the arms of Bolshevism.

The arrangements with the late Admiral Darlan were supposedly dictated by military necessity. But there are indications that the military leaders had hoped to deal primarily with General Giraud, and that Darlan's presence on the spot and the consequent necessity of dealing with him as the holder of the actual power in North Africa was due, not to military but to political manipulations. Behind the strategy which made this possible is a well thought out plan to establish a conservative Catholic southern European world in which the Catholic faith will be used as a weight against radical political and economic ideas.

The administration's recognition of Otto of Hapsburg as the recruiting agent of the Austrian Legion is an even more ominous sign of this kind of diplomacy than its previous Vichy politics. There was absolutely no reason for Otto's recognition and no plausible pretext for it. The Hapsburg clique would like to reestablish a Danubian monarchy which would include not only the nations, previously subject to the Hapsburg dynasty, but Catholic Bavaria as well. They could not possible have gained any support for such designs in this country if there were not elements in the Catholic hierarchy who support the plan and if certain military and industrial groups did not regard it as the best insurance against the menace of communism.

There are Catholic prelates, who only yesterday had hoped to carve out a sphere of influence for clerical fascism in an Axis controlled world, who are now intent upon finding a realm of security for Catholic authoritarianism in a democratic world. They have found their chance in the fears of conservative forces in the democracies, that Europe may become too radical and the belief in these same circles that the Catholic church is the only source of authority, not disintegrated by Nazism, which can supply the basis for a conservative Europe.

We are far from desiring the destruction of a Catholic culture in Europe. Nor are we unappreciative of its robustness in defying Nazi paganism. It is a fact however that Catholicism finds authoritarian government, so long as it is not pagan and accepts the tutelage of the church, more congenial than democracy. It is a fact that this kind of Catholicism would like to set the clock back in Europe and seek for a stabilization of the social order on a clerical fascist basis. The irony of this situation lies in the fact that this kind of international politics will help to produce what it is designed to avoid. It will throw Europe into the hands of communism. The nations of Europe have been impoverished to such a degree, and the basis of any kind of bourgeois democracy has been so completely destroyed by the war, that any sort of democracy which would be established in Europe by the free will of the people would certainly be more equalitarian than the privileged sections of American democracy would like to contemplate. It may be added that these classes are almost equally disturbed by the great probability that Britain will solve its domestic problems far to the left of anything on the horizon in America.

Thus we have the interesting picture of American plutocracy flirting with clerical fascism as a method of preventing a radicalization of the western world. It is almost certain however that if the peoples of Europe are faced with the choice between clerical fascism and communism they will choose the latter. That is how the nicely laid plans to prevent the bolshevization of Europe will help to bring about the very end they intend to avoid.

It is not at all certain to what degree President Roosevelt is lending himself to such conservative plans. Certainly his natural inclinations do not lie in that direction. Nevertheless the administration, particularly in its recognition of Otto, shows that it is amenable to the influences we have outlined. Quite obviously the pretensions of Otto would not be taken seriously by any government, except for the Catholic pressure behind them.

These issues are of course by no means decided. The democratic forces in America have not yet made themselves felt in foreign policy. The danger is that they will be aroused too late; and that meanwhile many steps will have been taken under the cover of the war which will be difficult to undo later. It is therefore high time that democratic public opinion be moulded and directed in America to the end of a post-war policy which will not betray the hopes of the common people all over the world.

Perhaps it ought to be added that Great Britain, whose imperialistic designs so many liberal Americans have professed to fear, is on a better road in foreign policy than we are. It rejected the blandishments of Otto and Empress Zita. It disliked the Darlan deal. And its more intimate relations with Russia prevent the irresponsible anti-communist policy upon which American reactionaries intend to embark.

The Pope's Christmas Message.

The annual message of the Pope at Christmas time is significant for the fact that it has become increasingly a statement of the relevance of the Christian faith to the various social and political problems which vex our world. The statement last month was more unequivocal than any previously made. The

Pope rightly condemned theories which "claim for particular nations or races or classes the juridical instict as the final imperative from which there is no appeal" and also the philosophies of state absolutism which regard the state as a "an absolute and supreme entity" which is "exempt from criticism and control." The condemnation of Marxism is remarkably restrained in the latest papal message. The Pope is content to declare: "Always moved by religious motives the church has condemned the various form of Marxist socialism and she condemns them today." But this condemnation is merely a prelude to the statement that "the church cannot overlook the fact that the worker . . . is opposed by a machinery which not only is not in accordance with nature but is at variance with God's plan and with the purpose he had in creating the goods of the earth." Here he restores the ancient teaching of the church, once very influential, according to which all the treasures of the earth should be made available to all men. The Pope draws distributist, rather than communist conclusions from the religious idea of a divine ownership of all property. He thinks that private property should be a privilege of all men and that a propertyless worker is condemned to "economic dependence and slavery." He wisely observes that this kind of slavery is possible either "through the exploitation of private property or through the power of the state."

It is not possible to do justice to the full program of social justice for individuals and nations which the Pope elaborated in his Christmas message. It must certainly be regarded as superior to many secular and Protestant analyses of social problems, which ignore one or another aspect of the complexities of social justice. There is a remarkable balance in this Catholic statement.

Its primary defect is derived from a general defect in all Catholic social theory. It is based upon the assumption that there are in two sources, the natural law of justice and in the Scriptural law of love exact and precise definitions of every problem of justice. It assumes that universal principles of justice have been challenged primarily by positivists and relativists who "give a deceptive majesty to purely human law" and who "leave way open to a fateful divorce between law and morality."

This is a Catholic thesis which every Catholic teacher has been expounding in recent years. According to it the explicit egotism of Nazi politics is but the final product of a pragmatism which rejects the standards of universal law for the sake of laws of expediency. According to this thesis the secular world has undermined law and order by its moral cynicism. On the whole this is a false polemic of Christianity against secularism, in which many Protestants have also participated.

There is indeed a decadent cynical, relativist and nihilistic fringe of secular culture. But on the whole modern culture is utopian, universalist and moralistic. It believes in the possibility of establishing universal justice, and universal culture. It has rejected Christianity because it thinks it knows of simpler methods of saving both men and nations than Christianity proposes. The real fact is that both Catholicism and modern culture have one thing in common. They know much too exactly just what justice is. Modern rationalism and Catholic rationalism both have too great a confidence in the ability of reason to state

the laws of justice. Both fail to understand the full interplay between reason and interest and passion in man's social life. The most sophisticated moderns draw cynical conclusions from this taint of interest in all historic justice and declare that there is no justice. But the more naive moderns are agreed with Catholicism in estimating the ability of man to define the eternal laws which govern society. Only the moderns would allow the scientists, rather than the church, to define the laws. And they believe that the knowledge of the law is sufficient to guarantee its fulfillment; while Catholicism takes human sin more seriously than that. It believes that only an infusion of grace will enable man to fulfill the law which transcends his own interests.

Simple moralism, rather than moral cynicism, has brought us so close to disaster in the modern world. Not many moderns are Nazis who believe that there is no good but "my" good. But there are many moderns, both Christian and secular, who believe it easy to define the good without corrupting the definition by "my" interest; and to realize it without compounding it with self-interest. We dare not disavow general standards of justice. But neither must we give ourselves to the illusion that they are either easily defined or simply realized. Some of our worst social evils are derived, not from the cynics, who acknowledge no standard but their own, but from the fanatics who acknowledge an absolute standard but fail to detect the corruption of self-interest in their definition of the absolute.

The Probable End of the New Deal.

The last congressional election, which reduced the democratic majority in congress to the point where a combination of democratic and republican conservatives will force the President's loyal following to become a minority, was not fought on domestic or economic issues. Its results have been hailed as a repudiation of the New Deal, whereas the victories in Africa, had they come ten days earlier, would undoubtedly have changed the results. But history is sometimes determined by such accidents. While the elections were not actually a repudiation of the President's domestic policy it is nevertheless obvious that the New Deal is beginning to break up; and the congressional elections were the beginning of the disintegration.

The most ominous sign of disintegration is the inclination of the American farmers to disavow the New Deal and to return to their Republican allegiance. The defeat of Senator Norris in Nebraska, where he has been able to triumph for forty years, no matter what party he chose to represent, is indicative of this trend in agrarian thought. The farmers, as Senator Norris has observed, were for the New Deal when it saved them from catastrophe; but are against it when it becomes identified with price ceilings, rationing and every kind of war discipline. It is to be feared that, not only among farmers but in the general public, the present administration will be forced to carry the onus of war restrictions. They will be uncritically identified with New Deal "collectivism." After the war the impatience of the public with such restrictions will undoubtedly result in a tremendous clamor for "free enterprise." The powerful interests in America, who fear the necessary restraints which political society has gradually placed upon economic society, will exploit this general impatience of the public with war restrictions for their own

ends. That is why the danger of domestic reaction in America after the war is growing. This is the more remarkable when compared with Britain where the Beveridge social security plan, which offers a modicum of security to every citizen has been also unanimously hailed as defining the general trend of politics in post-war Britain. Britain, in other words, is bound to have more rather than less political interference with economic life; while we are in danger of an uncritical destruction of many of the restraints which have developed in the past decade. Furthermore the policy of Britain will probably be determined by radical tories rather than by a triumphant labor party. For there is little prospect of a triumph of labor in Britain after the war. Our tories on the other hand are planning the most stupid kind of reaction.

The defeat of the bill eliminating the poll tax, at the end of the last congress was encompassed by a deal between conservative Republicans and Democrats. It is an augury of things to come. Without question an effort will be made by the same combination to defeat the Wagner act in the coming congress and to destroy many other achievements of the past decade. It is not at all clear how far these conservative plans may carry. The whole political future is, in fact unclear. The recent address of Gov. Dixon of Alabama reveals a concerted effort of conservative democrats to destroy the New Deal leadership. James Farley openly rejoiced over the democratic defeats in the last election and attributed them to the unpopularity of the New Deal. This was rather ironic, since the democratic party would have won in New York had it not been saddled with Farley's candidate.

The possibility of a conservative democratic nomination is increasing. And it is also quite apparent that Willkie's following does not control the Republican party. It is controlled by die-hard reactionaries. The best that Willkie may be able to do will be to prevent Republicanism from becoming identified with isolationism. The political future of the next decade may be determined by the policy of New Deal democrats and Willkie Republicans. Is it possible that they may unite? Or is Willkie's curious political creed a formula for reaction at home and liberalism abroad?

Social Security in Britain.

Sir William Beveridge's report on social security has now been published in this country by MacMillans under the title "Social Insurance and Allied Services." It is, as everyone knows by now, a comprehensive plan for universal social security in Britain after the war. It would not be possible to analyse the report in detail. What is significant about it is that it proposes for the first time that a modern nation shall assume full responsibility for minimal security for the entire population of the country. The plan proposes benefit payments for unemployment, disability, retirement, widows grants, childrens allowances, marriage grants, funeral grants and health and rehabilitation services. It is a contributory scheme which will require twenty years to mature. Part of the costs, according to the scheme, will however be born by general taxation on the ground that "the richer man, because of his capacity to pay" must pay more "for the general purposes of the community" than he would pay in a purely contributory scheme.

The plan has been criticised from two opposing camps in this country. On the one hand the more radical section of the community sees it as something less than the socialization which modern technical society requires. On the other hand critics of the "Life-Time-Fortune" type are critical of the plan because they think it loads the British economy with a new burden which will place it at a disadvantage in international competition. In regard to the first criticism it seems sufficient to say that no plan by which a community assumes responsibility for the minimal security of an entire population ought to be criticised for not going far enough, if, in fact it makes a genuine advance over previous standards. The second criticism is beside the point.

The Beveridge plan is obviously not a program for meeting world competition in the field of commerce and industry. It does not assume any particular standard of wealth or poverty of one nation in comparison with other nations. It merely elaborates principles of distributing the common fund of a whole national economy in such a way that minimal security is guaranteed to everyone. If such a plan is to be criticised because it is not integral to a scheme for meeting world competition this can only mean that the criticism rests upon a favorite American assumption that social securities must be financed from increased prosperity, so that they will not cost the wealthier portion of the community anything absolutely but only relatively.

The real fact is that Britain is taking this plan seriously partly because it expects to be poorer after the war than it was before; and it hopes to apply some of the lessons of mutuality, learned in war, in peace-time. Justice becomes more and more important, the smaller the total wealth, which a community can distribute. Undoubtedly one of the reasons why Britain will be inclined to turn left in domestic politics, while we will make one more effort to turn right and to disavow the very responsibilities which Britain intends to assume in larger proportions, is because Britain will have less economic margin than we will have.

If we say "Britain intends" to do this we do not assume that the Beveridge report will be accepted just as it stands. But it is significant that it has been welcomed with a unanimity which seems almost incredible. This unanimity is a revelation of one of the finest aspects of British life: the basic unity of national purpose, below and above the level of party conflict. Britain is undoubtedly more feudal in its social stratification than we are. But if any American equalitarian should draw self-righteous conclusions from a comparison between our social equalitarianism and Britain's class snobbishness let him reflect upon the fact that Britain bids fair to adopt minimal standards of social justice with comparative unanimity, which will remain subject to party debate among us for a generation to come.

On the whole the social peace of Britain is more secure than ours in the next decade.

Rationing and Democracy.

A leader of Christian thought and life, recently returned from a tour of the country, reported that there was an appalling confusion in the minds of church people on the question of liberty and democracy. These church people insisted on identifying rationing with fascism, as they had previously identified conscription with tyranny. This fact re-

veals to what degree democracy is based upon liberatarian assumptions in both secular and religious circles in America. Democracy is supposed to be identical with freedom; and any restriction upon freedom is thought of as a denial of the democratic way of life. It was in that spirit that conscription was condemned as undemocratic. In the same spirit the pious housewife now regards rationing as a proof that we have sacrificed democracy.

Rationing is actually the best implementation of the spirit of equality. When, as in war time, consumers goods are scarce, it is impossible to maintain a free market. The scramble of competitive buyers would merely result in a special advantage to the rich over the poor. The privileged would be able to pay the higher prices for scarcer goods; and the poor would have to be content with left-overs. No semblance of justice can be maintained in war-time without price ceilings on the one hand and rationing on the other. Despite some mistakes, the government has done rather well in both its price fixing and rationing program. Its record is particularly good, if we remember that it has had to deal with very ignorant opposition, not a little of which has been informed by supposedly Christian presuppositions.

It is a rather sad commentary on the state of Christian thought that men should identify the right to do as they please, without regard to the weal and woe of others, with "Christian liberty." It is high time that Christian libertarians learned something of the paradoxical relation between liberty and equality in the heart of democracy. Democracy does not mean absolute equality; for no society can live with out differentiation of functions which qualify equality. Therefore a dogmatic equalitarianism inevitably results in a destruction of liberty as the history of Stalinism proves. But on the other hand democracy does not mean absolute liberty either. For absolute liberty always turns out in the end to be the liberty of the strong to take advantage of the weak. Liberty can never stand alone. The problem of a democatic society is always to preserve the greatest amount of liberty, compatible with the necessities of community.

If the general public does not understand this relation the invariable consequence is an actual loss of liberty. For any society is bound to preserve its unity in a time of crisis; and if it cannot count on the voluntary compliance with fixed rules of justice it must increase the measure of coercion by which they are enforced. Ideally a society, composed of socially intelligent and responsible citizens achieves many standards of justice by methods which are neither purely voluntary nor purely coercive. They are not voluntary because the standard is set by governmental authority. They are voluntary, if the citizen recognizes the necessity of the restriction and complies with it gladly. If a society is informed by too libertarian conceptions of democracy it actually destroys some of its liberties by this mistake. For it encourages defiance of necessary restrictions and forces the government to increase the measure of coercion required to maintain them.

Power and Justice.

We call especial attention to Prof. Carl Mayer's article in this issue, dealing with the problem of power and world organization. The significance of the article lies in the fact that a political scientist of the first rank deals with the problem of

power and world organization upon the basis of acknowledged Christian presuppositions. This ought not to be unusual. But it is, because political scientists in this country have tended to be either cynics who refuse to take the problem of justice seriously; or utopians who dream of the day when "reason" will supplant force. In as far as we have had a "Christian" approach to political questions it has rested upon the assumption that the cynics were wrong and only the utopians right.

We have only one quarrel with Prof. Mayer, and that is in his contention that power is of itself evil. This idea is incompatible with his general approach to politics and a quite unnecessary concession to his opponents. There is indeed no power in history which is free of egoistic corruption. All power in history benefits the wielder of it more than it ought; and benefits those who are subject to it less than is claimed. This is the sinful corruption in all historic reality. But power can not be evil of itself, unless life itself be regarded as evil. For life is power. Life is never pure form or pure reason. It is inherently dynamic. Even the purest "reason" is power. According to the Christian faith perfect power and goodness are united only in God. But this is not because life is inherently evil; but because all power in history is partial. It may pretend to serve only the commonweal. But it always serves itself more than the commonweal.

If however we fear the injustice of power too much we deliver the world into anarchy. That was the consequence of utopian thought after the last war. The real contribution of Christian faith to problems of world organization lies not in imitating the utopianism of secular rationalists, adding only pious phrases to their dreams, but in encouraging men and nations to assume the responsibilities which inhere in the possession of power with as little pride as possible. Since no nation will be more powerful than our own after the war, no greater issue confronts the world than the question whether we have achieved sufficient political maturity to exercise our power responsibly. One danger is that we may flee from our responsibilities into isolationism once again. The other danger is that we may use our power unjustly. The first danger is greater than the second.

POWER AND WORLD ORGANIZATION

By CARL MAYER

In the following pages I propose to deal with the question of the future world organization from the point of view of the problem of power. In suggesting this approach I do not wish to suggest the implication that there are no other possible approaches to the question or that they are not equally or even more important. However, I should like to state my definite belief that to have a satisfactory and definite answer to the problem of the relation between power and world order is an indispensable prerequisite of any inquiry into the question at hand, from whatever standpoint. However excellent our ideas about the future world may be, they will turn out in the end to be wholly illusory unless they are established upon the basis of a definite and clear notion as to the place and function of power in that future world. Without a full grasp of the problem of power the subject into which inquiry is supposedly made, cannot even be apprehended in its real dimension and thus is not susceptible to any precise determination. The subject "Power and World Order" is encompassed only with great difficulty. It admits of neither an easy nor a hasty answer. And the right answer, I think, will come only after some very hard thinking, on a vast range, by many people.

I.

To our problem two answers have been given, each diametrically opposed to the other. They are based on two different philosophical interpretations of the nature of man and the world and thus clearly reveal that it is in the realm of philosophy that our problem ultimately resides. In order to have an outline of the theoretical aspect of our problem let us, briefly, consider each of these interpretations.

According to the one interpretation the world is fundamentally rational, or to be more precise, there is a fundamental identity of world and reason. The irrational forces as they exist in the world are, of course, not denied. Yet, it is maintained that they are incidental to, rather than constitutive of, the structure of the world. They are manifestations of a still imperfect state of the world and must themselves be considered as mere imperfections and deficiencies. Hence, they are capable of being eliminated in the end. Neither the irrationalities of nature nor the irrationalities of history are such that they are not, essentially, conquerable by reason. There is, it is true, the fact of strife and struggle and conflict in the world, and the fact cannot be denied. Yet, there is no reason to suppose that struggle and conflict cannot be abolished and harmony be established in their place. A world of universal harmony is entirely within the reach of possibility. There is, it is true, the fact of misery and suffering and the perplexity of evil in the world, and their reality cannot be

disputed. But again, their reality must not be taken to mean essential inevitability. Both misery and evil can be eradicated from the world. A world of happiness and virtue is fully attainable. Or consider the social-political order. The fact is that mankind is still in dispersion, divided as it is into the fragments of nations and states, each potentially hostile to the other. Yet, neither dispersion nor hostility need exist. Mankind united and governed by the principle of brotherliness is not merely an abstract ideal but a distinct and entirely realizable possibility. It is acknowledged that oppression and injustice and inequality prevail among us. But they too can be overcome and be replaced by a world of freedom, justice, and equality.

From such a view two conclusions emerge as regards the essential nature of the world. The first is that because the world is intrinsically rational it is capable of a definitive arrangement of things as well as of a perfect arrangement of things in the sense of an earthly paradise. There may be differences of opinion as to how the transformation from the state of imperfect and deficient reality to the state of perfect and definitive ideality will be brought about. Liberalism for instance asserts that the world is open to *direct* manageability by reason and that therefore the goal of ideality can be achieved through ever increasing application of the instrument of reason to human affairs, through ever increasing rational "planning" for example. Hegelianism-Marxism, on the other hand, holds the profounder view that it is in and through the objective dialectic processes of history—processes which while beyond the reach of human reason, use the irrational in the world to good ends—that the world will finally be brought to ideality. Whatever the answer to the question of method may be, there can, however, be no doubt that in the end the ideal can and will be established. And the second conclusion is that, because the world is intrinsically rational, it comes to realize its highest inner potentialities in the state of ideality. There it expresses itself in purity and finality.

What is the meaning of power in the context of these ideas? There is no need here to try to define in formal terms what power is. Power is an elusive, or as the sociologists would say, an "amorphous" phenomenon and thus not open to any easy formal definition. What must be fully understood in our present study is what I should like to call the "demonic" nature of power, that is the fact that power (and especially that power which expresses itself in the political order) always implies the—potential or actual—use of force and coercion and, in the ultimate resort, the power to kill. Over against any neutral or merely esthetic definition of power this fundamental fact must be strongly emphasized. Now, if this be the nature of power, the answer to our question must be that power is clearly a phenomenon of the still imperfect world. In this phase of the world it may or may not have an empirical-historical justification. Yet, power will, and must be made to, disappear. It must, and eventually will, be changed into "law" or as the phrase goes, "right" will take the place of "might." For with a world which is intrinsically rational, power is ultimately incommensurate. In it it has, essentially, neither place nor function. It is merely an irrational *factum brutum,* deeply disturbing, because wholly incomprehensible from the standpoint of reason. There is, in the end, no justification for the existence of

power. Every rationalism, if it is true to itself, implies a theory of power which must, as far as political power is concerned, issue into radical pacifism and anarchism.

According to the second interpretation the world is fundamentally non-rational. There is, of course, no denying the presence and efficacy of reason in the world. It is, however, argued that the irrational factors of life in nature and history establish barriers which it is impossible for reason ever to overstep. These barriers reason may succeed in pushing back, but it cannot remove them. Nature and history are basic to the order of the world. The world is not primarily made in the image of reason. The world, rather than being essentially rational, is, above all, to use a term of Schelling's, a rationally never exhaustible "reality." It is an imperative of reason that there be harmony instead of struggle and conflict. Yet, it is illusory to believe that this command can ever be realized. There will always be struggle and conflict. We may succeed in changing the form in, and reducing the extent to, which conflict is carried on; but it is impossible to abolish it altogether. For actual life is always based on struggle and conflict. If one tries nevertheless to abolish it altogether or to avoid it at any cost, one is merely creating chaos.[1] It is another imperative of reason that instead of misery and evil there be happiness and the good life. Yet it should be obvious that while we may be able to alleviate suffering and mitigate evil, neither can ever be wholly abolished. These are stern and inexorable facts of life. Or again, reason demands the creation of a united mankind and the establishment of justice and peace and freedom. Yet to believe that the idea of a united mankind can ever fully materialize in actual history is to overlook the toughness which races, nations and states display. Mankind cannot establish itself in abstract unity, it can find expression only in and through the fragments of which it consists. Hence the possibility of tension and hostility cannot be avoided. So also justice and freedom and peace, are incapable of absolute realization. Every order, however just, is based upon injustice; to every order, however free, clings the taint of oppression; and every order, however peaceable, includes the possibility of war.

The world, in other words, is such that it cannot be established in ideality. It is of the very essence of the world that it is unstable and transitory. In the second place, the world is essentially antinomic in structure. These antinomies can never wholly be resolved and they preclude any possibility of a perfect or paradisic order. In the language of theology, the world is informed by sin and the shadow of death and destruction is cast over it.

Finally, the world does not reveal its highest inner potentiality in the state of final ideality. The potentialities of the world cannot but be realized in the here and now: the temporality and historicity of its actual existence. The world cannot be re-created in the image of reason, it can only be renewed in its own image. Thus the vision of an ideal world turns out to be not only impossible of attainment but also a goal not to be desired. In a sense the true potentialities of man in the world, come to life only in the tension between the rational and the ir-

1. The recent history of pacifism may perhaps serve as an illustration. If one tries to avoid war at any cost, one just stumbles into it.

rational, the good and the evil, the misery and the grandeur of life. A world without these possibilities is a world without real depth and — ultimately — without transcendence. The notion of an illusory world of repose in ideality should be replaced by a true sense of human and historical destiny.

What are the conclusions to be drawn from such an interpretation of the world as regards the problem of power? Power, it should be obvious, can no longer be considered as a mere fleeting phenomenon of a still imperfect past or present, destined to disappear. Of every order of the world it must be considered an integral part. In an essentially unstable world power serves as a center of crystallization and hence as a principle of order. Without the existence of power the world would fall into chaos and anarchy. The world needs the bulwark of power, as it were, as a breakwater against the deluge of anarchy and chaos. There is no denying the fact that power in itself is evil: "Macht ist boese," as Jakob Burkhardt simply and monumentally put it— yet because power is a barrier against anarchy, it is restraint of evil also, and in this sense it is not merely indispensable but also justified and good. Power is not only real but it is also true. The question of *why* there is power, cannot be answered with any rational finality, for the problem of power is one which baffles the human mind and defies any definitive rational explanation. It belongs to those problems which cannot be "solved" but can only be approximated in philosophical or theological speculation. That there is power and that it partakes of truth and reality, is indicative of the ultimately irrational i.e., impenetrable and unfathomable foundation of the world.

It follows from these considerations that the problem of a just order which underlies the subject "Power and World Order" must be both formulated and answered in an entirely different manner according to which of the two interpretations of the nature of the world and the nature of power one accepts. According to the first interpretation there is an essentially negative relationship between power and justice, and the establishment of a just order is therefore contingent upon the abolition of power. The problem, therefore, resolves itself into the question of how to decrease power in ever increasing measures so as to cause it to disappear in the end. The answer is given definitively in a set of abstract and a priori principles. Whatever difficulties there may be in a concrete situation, they are, theoretically at least, capable of final solution. According to the second interpretation the relationship between power and justice is dialectical rather than negative. A just order cannot be established through the abolition of power, but only through the use of power to such ends as to realize whatever relative justice is possible in the world. The problem, therefore, resolves itself into the question of how to shape power, be it from within or from without, directly or indirectly, in such a way as to avoid the danger of nakedness, sheer arbitrariness and brutality which are always present in power, and to make it meaningful and responsible. The answer to this question cannot be given by merely relying on abstract and apriori principles. The answer must ultimately always be concrete and historical. It cannot be provided by principles alone, but must ultimately be "existential." It must be based on the intuitive understanding of a concrete historical situation, and must be

an act of free decision by man, thereby involving the possibility of error, tragedy and guilt, but at the same time giving man the possibility of real freedom.

This is not the place to decide the issue between the two views of our problem which I have here been merely endeavoring to outline in descriptive analysis. I should like to say however that the first view is not in my opinion adequate to, or compatible with, the Christian doctrine of man and the world. However the relation between creation and sin is interpreted the Christian doctrine, as I understand it, must stand against the fallacy that the world is intrinsically good and virtuous and inherently capable of perfection. There can be no identification between the world and the kingdom of God. There must always be tension between the two; and Christian eschatology must not be confused with utopian thinking. It has, I think, been rightly said that whereas the heretic has low ideals and high expectations the Christian must have high ideals and moderate expectations. And I submit that the concept of an earthly paradise is informed by low ideals.

II.

Turning from the abstract problems to those of the concrete situation in which the problem "Power and World Order" presents itself today, we must, first, briefly analyze the nature of the modern world order as it emerged in the 19th century in order to supply historical perspective for our study. The basic problem of the modern world is given by the facts: that nations are sovereign independent states, without any authority higher than the individual state; and that war is a justified instrument of international policy. Under these conditions disorder is inevitable. Given these conditions, how can anarchy and war be avoided and peace and order be established? Generally and prevailingly the question is answered with reference to the theory of the balance of power. According to his theory, order is established through that which seems to lead only to disorder: the self-interest of the various nations. For if the individual nations and states each pursue their own interests and if they see that their interests are best served by preventing any concentration of superior power, then through the free interplay of the forces let loose a balance of power will eventually be achieved. Power will cancel power, and thus the danger of anarchy and tyranny inherent in power will be avoided and in their place peace and order, law and freedom can prevail. In other words, order rests upon the equilibrium though it be only unstable and constantly changing, of neutralized powers. It is the result of objective, mechanical or quasi-mechanical, processes which almost possess the dignity of natural laws.

While the theory of the balance of power is plausible at first sight, it proves, on closer inspection, to be entirely inadequate for a real solution. In the first place, it can be shown that the process of balancing power can take place only within the framework of an already given order. Left to itself, it would fail to create any order. At the basis of balanced power there must always be organized or integrated power. Thus order depends primarily on the existence of concentrated power and only secondarily on the operation of the balance of power. Order is never the mere result of the mechanical process of the equilibrium of power; above everything else, it requires the presence of actual, conscious, and superior power. In the

second place, it can be demonstrated that the supposed mechanical process of the balance of power requires definite moral and intellectual safeguards. There must be not only technical skill in playing the game, but also the willingness to observe the rules of restraint and responsibility. Far from being a mere mechanical or automatic process, the balance of power is predicated upon the existence of a moral-intellectual climate conducive to it. Without this condition, the pursuit of the national self-interests will result in a clash, rather than the supposed harmony, between them. Whatever there is of order depends in the last analysis—as far as the problem of power is concerned—upon the existence of integrated power and upon its responsible and legitimate exercise. For the correctness of this assertion ample evidence is provided by the actual historical development. Direct and positive evidence, it seems to me, is provided by the achievement of the order which the 19th century enjoyed over a long period of time. The achievement was due, on the one hand, to the existence of the British Empire and its superior power, and, on the other hand, to the prevalence of a moral-intellectual climate which allowed the balance of power to function smoothly. As long as these conditions prevailed, disorder and war could be localized and peace and order, however unstable and precarious, were assured. When, however, the change of position in relation to other powers which the British Empire was slowly suffering, and the emergence of an exclusive, reckless, and an entirely self-assertive nationalism caused these conditions to disappear, the system of the balance of power ceased to function and the order was doomed to collapse. Indirect and negative evidence is given by the failure of the efforts to re-establish a new world order after the first world war. This order was to be constituted by, first, encouraging the independence of the national states on the basis of the principle of national self-determination and secondly by superimposing a fictitious federal union upon them. The league, without real power, was to re-unite the individual fragments and to sustain the international community. In other words, the attempt at re-establishing a new order was based on the belief in the principle of an essential harmony of interests to be achieved through the balance of power and on the belief that actual power can be dispensed with and reason, good will can be fully relied upon. Yet, it should have been obvious that under the conditions of an intense nationalism the balance of power is not capable of functioning satisfactorily and that a belief in reason and a deprecation of power is wholly utopian. It is, therefore, not surprising that the attempts at establishing order ended in dismal failure and finally in the colossal catastrophe of the present war.

III.

A full discussion of the future world order is beyond the scope of this paper. I should like, however, to set down in briefest outline what I consider to be the conclusions to be derived from the foregoing considerations. Negatively, it appears to me that any discussion of the future world order along merely traditional lines is bound to be unsatisfactory. The past is irrevocable and any attempt to revive it is neither possible nor desirable. We must realize that no answer is acceptable unless it be radical, that is to say, open to an understanding of the real depth of the crisis by which we are confronted; and that a discussion along mere-

ly utopian lines is equally inadequate. Neither the nicety of a vague federative order of the world, essentially based on the same conditions as the old League of Nations, nor the enormity of a utopian world state can be called, to use Toynbee's terminology, creative responses to the profound historical challenge of our time. Positively, it appears to me, then, that the answer to the problem lies rather in the establishment of a world order based on the consolidation of power in a few centers or based on what I should like to call Empires. If the solution of the problem of order for which the ancient world was groping was finally found in the establishment of the Roman Empire, the solution for which we are groping appears to me to be the establishment of a plurality or rather hierarchy of Empires by which the world is to be ruled. The term "empire" is apt to arouse resentment and indignation especially in democratic countries. Yet before we succumb to these sentiments we should ask ourselves whether our resentment and indignation may not spring from the overtures of a word rather than from the nature of the thing which the word is supposed to designate. What is empire, after all? At bottom, empire means, to quote Professor Cobben,[1] "the existence of a power covering a large area and including different nations." Nothing more is implied. Empire is compatible with the most diverse forms of organization. It is, thus, perfectly compatible with a political organization which allow the several parts a large participation in the exercise of power. It is especially compatible with a large measure of devolution and hence with the most extended self-government in all affairs not strictly political and military. Nor is there, finally, any reason why it should not be compatible with the establishment of international welfare organizations and their disassociation from direct political control or with the protection by international law of the rights of the individual over and above the state. Incompatible with empire are disarmament and most ideas of collective security. What belongs, by definition, to empire, is political control and unified military strength, so that there will be no uncertainty where power lies and who is responsible for its exercise. Empire means, it is true, power, i.e., inequality of strength. It must be quite clear that an empire is a hierarchical political order rather than one based on equality. Yet this does not mean that the possibility of moral equality is excluded.

An imperial solution of the problem of order is likely to evoke strong objections. Granted that there must be power, it might be argued, is not the tremendous accumulation of power, which empire implies, such that its abuse is all but inevitable and that, therefore, disorder instead of order will be the result? Is there anything to prevent the rise of either anarchy or tyranny? The answer to these objections depends on whether we believe empires to be inherently possessed of such safeguards as will constitute an effective curb on the aggressiveness as well as the arbitrariness of power. While these objections should not be dismissed lightly, two considerations can, perhaps, be set against them. Compared with the essential aggressiveness of a political order based on nationalism, empires appear to be defensive rather than aggressive. Not only their bigness but also the substitution of a more cosmo-

1. Alfred Cobben, The Crisis of Civilization. London 1941. p. 22 F. H.

politan outlook for the parochialism of mere nationalism seem to militate against openly aggressive behavior. The secret of empire, if one is to believe historical evidence, appears to be that it retains power by not openly exercising it. As regards the danger of arbitrariness and irresponsibility, it should be pointed out that there is certainly the possibility of creating an intellectual-moral atmosphere in which, through the evolution of law, power may become responsible and legitimate and thereby tolerable to those who are subjected to it. If recent events seem to contradict this point, historical evidence on the whole rather confirms it. Finally, in the matter of checks from without, we must realize that the very strength of empires, far from being an incentive to war, is a force of restraint. It creates a healthy respect and makes for eagerness to come to terms rather than to clash. A real balance of power is possible within an imperial framework, not because there is a pre-established harmony of interests to be effected through a mechanism of checks and balances but because there is a conscious effort to keep conflicting interests from clashing. We should not forget that it is the strong who keep the peace.

We cannot say that the imperial solution of the problem of order will certainly bring peace as against war and order as against disorder. What we can say, however, is that peace and order are distinct possibilities, their reelization being dependent upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. There is ground to entertain doubt that the same can be said of other solutions of our problem, commonly suggested today.

IV.

Let us, despite its hazards, try to visualize the concrete form which an order of empires would assume in the future world. Assuming a victory of the United Nations, the world is bound to be dominated by four great powers: The United States, possessing a position of hegemony in the Western hemisphere and in the Western Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; the British Empire, probably greatly modified as far as her Eastern possessions are concerned, yet still strong and probably stronger than it was before having been forged anew in the fires of this war; Russia, the greatest land power on the Eurasian continent; and finally China, the strongest power in the Far East.[1] Of these powers the United States is likely to emerge as the strongest in terms of political, military and economic power. Hence, everything will depend, first, on her willingness to undertake the exercise of such power as is hers, and, secondly, on her ability to establish such relations with the other great powers as not to endanger the peace of the world. We do not know the answer to either problem. And the difficulties in finding a satisfactory arrangement should not be denied. Yet, while one must not be unduly optimistic, one must not be unduly pessimistic either. Perhaps we will actually meet the challenge of history successfully this time.

1. Of Europe, the potential fifth great power, nothing, I am afraid, can be said except two negative things: 1) that Germany has forfeited her natural role of unifying the continent; political as well as moral considerations require that she must not be given any real political power for a long time to come whatever her position in a future world will be; and 2) that a so-called European federation is not likely to materialize without the strong support of outside forces and hence without the locus of power lying somewhere else.

REFLECTIONS ON THE INCARNATION

By CLIFFORD L. STANLEY

I.

There are many incarnations.

We might very well begin with a definition of incarnation. The word comes from two Latin words which mean "in" and "flesh". Now if you sit down before this word and study its meaning, a simple picture rises in your mind. On one side you have "flesh" and on the other side you have something else. These two things are different and apart. Then this "something else" comes and enters into the flesh. The word "incarnation" describes this act of entering in. There is something special about the coming together of these two things; that is why we need a special word for it.

So we have the word incarnation and it means the entering of something into flesh or body. Our word "embodiment" is a very exact equivalent and perhaps means more to us than the Latin derivative "incarnation". What is it that enters into body in the act described by the word incarnation? It may be almost anything, such as "school spirit" or purpose, as in the sentence, "He is the very incarnation of resolution." In general, incarnation refers to the entering of some mental, spiritual or ideal thing into flesh.

There is a special use of the word incarnation and that is its use in religion. Here it means the entering of the divine into flesh. If incarnation means the entering of the divine in flesh, the word "flesh" must be expanded somewhat. It means not only the material body but also the whole of the rest of the make-up of man. Incarnation, in a word, means the entering of the divine into the human, of God into man.

At this point I should like to make an observation which may be surprising to some. It is this, incarnation, defined as the entering of the divine into the human, is a very common thing. Let me give an illustration or so.

It is a commonplace that the imperial family of Japan is supposed to be divine. I suppose some modern Japanese hold this belief with their tongue in their cheek, but I am not so sure, seeing that they have no high theological reason for rejecting the view. Whatever we may say of modern Japanese sophisticates, it is certain that the belief was held in quite a literal sense throughout the centuries. Leaving out a lot of details the story goes like this. The grandson of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, came to earth (i.e. Japan) and after defeating his rival, who was likewise related to another god, set up the Japanese dynasty. His grandchild in turn was Jimmu Tenno, who was supposed to be the first historical mikado of Japan. By means of inheritance the original divinity was passed along until it reaches the present mikado, Hirohito. One of the great titles of the Mikados expressing their relation to the Sun Goddess has always been the title "Heavenly Grandchild." The mikado

is thus an incarnation of the divine; divine life pulses within his human and earthly life. But the emperor is not only an individual, he is also related to the nation. He is the center of its unity, the expression of its power, the symbol of its life. Therefore the divinity of the emperor is the divinity of the nation. When the Japanese say that the emperor is divine they are not speaking of his divinity as a private possession of the emperor, something he can play against the nation. No. The emperor's divinity is a representative divinity. When the Japanese speak of it they are really saying that the nation is divine.

This truth appears with even greater clearness in the case of the Romans in the days of the Empire. The Roman emperors were considered to be gods. They did not receive their divinity by inheritance. Some of the emperors inherited the throne from their fathers but many of them won the throne from their rivals by the sword or by political deals. Nevertheless, no matter how they came to the royal chair, as soon as they became emperor they were declared to be gods. It is clear that the divinity came to the individual emperor because it clung to the office of emperor. Thus it is very transparent that what was really thought to be divine was the Roman Empire. The divinity of the emperor was merely a dramatic and localized expression of the divinity of the Empire.

A third illustration may be drawn from our own Scriptures. The prophet Hosea is speaking of the Exodus of Israel or of Egypt and he says these words, "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt." (Hosea 11:1.) Here the whole nation is spoken of as the son of God. The people has in its veins the divine life. It is the son of God. It is an incarnation.

I think I could show you by further examples that every nation considers its life to be an incarnation of the divine. Each nation believes that its life was intended by the divine and that it embodies eternal meanings. Every nation, therefore, is a revelation of the divine and the rich pattern of nations in time gives some inkling of the wealth which lies back of them in eternity.

What is true of nations and groups is also true of individuals. Each one of us has the right to feel and ought to feel that he is no accident in the universe. Rather each of us was intended by the deep core of the universe. Our life came forth from the secret place of the most high. We are His workmanship and in us is His life. Some years ago a book was written called *The Incarnation in Our Street* (by George Stewart). That title gives the flavor of the whole idea. Each of us in his street, his house, his room, is a special embodiment of something in the divine life. Just as no two individuals are alike so no two incarnations are alike. Each of us brings into the world some aspect of God, some idea in the divine mind which no one else can bring. We ought not to play this special revelation in us against the special revelations in other men. But we ought not to let them nor anything rob us of our high calling. When we think of some of our social and economic institutions against this background of man's divine status we get quite a shock. Men were meant to be gods and we treat them like dogs and tools.

By this time we have a great accumulation of incarnations. Every nation is included. Every individual is included. There is one question we might ask about

them all: how is incarnation brought about?

I think we can note two steps in the process. The first one is called first because it is the step that is closest and most accessible. Actually it depends on the other step and in this sense is second. It is men's *belief* that they have been intended by God and that His divine life is in them. Men are made sons of God by their belief. But their belief is not wishful thinking, it is not an illusion. Their belief corresponds to a real fact. *They believe* that God's life is in them *because it is in them.* God's life is in men because He put it there. The act by which this was done is hidden from us. We cannot inspect it; we can only state it. These, then, are the two steps of the process of incarnation. First, men believe that they embody some divine thing. Second, God places in them the divine thing which men embody.

At this point we mention for the first time the incarnation of Jesus. Many people get snarled up and finally lost altogether over the "machinery" of his incarnation. That is regretable. The procedure in his case is the same as that in every other case. It is, for example, no harder, no more complicated. For this reason it is a pity to lose the value of his incarnation because we cannot possibly see how it was brought about. When you have solved ours you have solved his, and if we cannot take his incarnation for granted we have no right to take our own or that of the nations of history for granted.

On the other hand, the machinery of the incarnations of Jesus is no more complex or mysterious than that in our own case. Doubtless there is something special about Jesus but it is not the method of his incarnation.

By this time we have two conclusions. First, to say that Jesus incarnates the divine is to say nothing special about him. All nations and all men do the same. Second, the problem of his incarnation is not a problem of its means or method. The process of his incarnation is like that of all the others.

II.

Why a new and special incarnation was needed.

Perhaps I have over-proved my case. In the Christian Church we had always believed that there was something special and unique about the incarnation of Jesus. I believe that to be true. So I must show why a special and unique incarnation is necessary.

One of the best stories ever told is the narrative of the Trojan war as recounted by Homer. It is fascinating even when we must struggle with it in Greek. Do you remember the story? There was a wedding and all the gods were there, that is, all but one who had not been invited. The one who had not been invited was Eris, the goddess of strife. Suddenly Eris appeared and threw a golden apple in the midst of the party. On this apple was engraved a few simple words, "To the fairest." "To the fairest"! Now there were three lady gods at the party—Hera, the wife of Zeus, Athena and Aphrodite, or Venus as she is more generally known. Each of the ladies naturally assumed that she was fairest and that the apple was intended for her. So they argued the matter passionately. But they could come to no conclusion. Finally they agreed to seek an arbitrator. The arbitrator they chose was a shepherd boy on Mt. Ida by the name of Paris. Paris was really the crown prince of Troy and how he

came to be a shepherd boy is another story.

The three goddesses suddenly appeared before Paris and asked him to decide the dispute. Hera, or Juno as she is better known, promised him power if he chose her. Athena promised him glory. Aphrodite promised the most beautiful woman in the world. Paris finally chose Aphrodite. Aphrodite then helped him find and carry off the fairest of women, one Helen. It was perhaps an embarrassing detail that Helen was the wife of Menelaus, King of Sparta. Menelaus naturally objected and stirred up the Greeks to avenge him. A coalition led by Agamemnon thereupon was formed and after a long siege burned and destroyed Troy. During the fierce struggle between the Greeks and the Trojans the goddesses suddenly appeared to be taking part in the fray. Aphrodite had got Paris in the mess so she supported his side. Hera and Athena, but particularly Athena who was very warlike, assisted Agamemnon and the Greeks.

How much of the Helen story is historically true we do not know. Most likely a commercial or imperialistic rivalry grew up between the Trojans and Greeks. Doubtless the rivalry grew until a mortal issue was the only alternative. Life itself was at stake. Naturally *all that was involved in life was at stake aiso, particulariy the divine meaning of life.* In terms of the previous section, when the incarnations strive with each other it seems inevitable that the heavenly things which are incarnated on earth should themselves struggle in heaven. Inevitably, therefore, when men struggle with each other they believe that the gods are pitted against each other as well. But the heavenly struggle is not thought of as a result of the earthly conflict. Rather, as in the example of the goddesses struggling over the apple and taking their dispute to Paris, the strife is supposed to originate in heaven and to be carried on on earth.

May I repeat the point I have just made. When men struggle with each other the strife is supposed by them to originate in eternity. That is to say that men fight in the name of and for the sake of their highest and dearest values. Many people when they think of war and strife assess them at a very low level. They say that these things come from the lower side of man, the less humanized aspects of mankind. It must be admitted that war reflects some very miserable things in man and that, once begun, wars bring out the worst side of man. But it is too simple to say that wars and tumults come only from the evil in man. Wars come from the good in man also. In fact I think that wars come more from what we call "good" in man than from what we ordinarily call "evil."

Take the present war for an example. On our side, why are we fighting? We are fighting of course because of our selfish isolation and indifference, our callous prosperity amid the poverty of nations. Coming up the scale, we are fighting for our existence. Still higher, we are fighting for the complex of values which makes life dear and which we call "democracy." We may not use religious language very much, but we believe "democracy" to be an ultimate value. We believe that the universe itself stands back of democracy and wills its continuance. The highest and most powerful part of our energy in this war comes from our defense, not of a simple biological existence, but of a set of values which are as

dear to heaven as to us. We fight heaven's own battle and in eternity there are forces which strive with us.

The same is true of the Germans. Make every allowance for German postwar poverty and desperation as a cause of their struggle. Make every allowance for blood-soaked imperialism. At the heart of the German effort lies a fanatic, a religious fervor. You can say that many of the Germans do not believe the Nazis and their doctrines. That is true. But the leaders believe them and the young people have been taught to believe them. They believe in the superiority of the German people, the *Volk.* They believe in its world mission. They believe in their new order. They believe in the divine, even to the extent of rehabilitating the old Teutonic gods. In all this there is real religious power and from this religious base comes the drive, the determination, the cruelty of the German war effort.

Man's war are not only *blessed by their religions;* their wars *come,* or seem to come, *from their religions.* Somehow men's tumults always involve their dearest values, particularly the dearest of all, namely, their relation with eternity. This means that their religions do not save them from strife. If our analysis be true, their religions give rise to combat. Meanwhile the conflicts of men are very deadly. They take the first-born and are satisfied with only the fairest. When the war is over one of the contenders may not rise again as with Troy or Carthage. Or it may live on in chains. Meanwhile both contenders are impoverished and brutalized and the stage is set for more war. War is the name for the death of social order; it is a kind of living death. From this living death men's religions do not save them. According to our analysis, their religions, the absolute values they incarnate, drive them into war. Thus in human terms, the incarnations of eternal value to be found in men drive them to mutual destruction and to death.

We can state the situation in divine terms as well as human terms. Athena and Aphrodite struggled together in the Trojan War. In this present war the divine thing underlying "democracy" strives with the divine thing underlying "ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuehrer." This result cannot be prevented. If men incarnate the divine and if they strive together then the struggle is reproduced in the divine sphere. Heaven is divided against itself. Peace and unity are put to flight from the eternal realm. The gods are compromised. Instead of lifting man up to their level, they are dragged down to the human level. Instead of the divine being a help to man it is actually made worse by man. And man is left to his own discord, which, as we saw, ends in death.

When we get this far, when we realize that man destroys himself and compromises the divine, we can explain the situation in three ways.

First, we can say that man does not really embody the divine. It is simply human pride and illusion to say that he does. We cannot accept this solution. It cuts human life off completely from meaning and goodness. It abandons man as a kind of foundling on the doorstep of the world.

Second, we can say that the peace and unity manifested by life came from the divine element incarnated in man. On the other hand, the evil and tumult came from something else. In this simple form we cannot accept this solution

either. It splits man in two. Man is no longer one being but two.

Third, we can say that man is one being and everything in him is involved in all that he does. This one source of action accounts for the good and amiable things in him. This same source of action accounts for the evil and disruptive things in him. What this means in terms of the divine thing incarnated by man is this: *the divine in man accounts for the evil as well as for the good.*

Now we are all agreed that the divine in itself cannot cause evil nor be a source of strife. Yet as it actually works out the divine does cause evil and generates strife. Men fight in the name of their gods. This is a simple statement of fact as can be verified by observation. Let us put these statements together: if the divine in itself cannot cause evil and if the divine as it actually functions in man does cause evil, there must be something wrong about the way the divine dwells and acts in men. God is truly incarnate in man but man has corrupted the incarnation. He has confused himself and God. Man has identified God's will and his own pride. Man, in a word, has spoiled the incarnation in himself. *That is why a new and different kind of incarnation was needed.*

III.

The manner in which The Incarnation is new and special.

Up till now we have discovered three things. First, every man and every group incarnates some aspect of the divine. Second, the evil and the struggles of human individuals and groups issue in death and breakdown and they compromise the gods. Third, this result is due to man's corruption of the divine thing he incarnates; it is due to his simple identification of himself with the divine. Consequently a new and special kind of incarnation is needed.

Let us look closely at what is needed. Man, we said, has confused himself and God. Man has identified his own proud aspirations with the will of God. The problem which confronts us therefore is this: how can we end this confusion of the divine and human wills; how can this misleading identification of human and divine be broken up? The problem is not to remove from man the incarnation which is in him but to purify it.

At first thought this seems a very simple thing to do. The thing to do is to train and purify the will. One should cease to will strife and begin to will harmony. He should cease to identify himself with God and think of the divine part of himself as a gracious guest, a heavenly loan. There is no doubt in the world that it is important to attempt all this. It can accomplish much. It is certainly true that a heroic will is better than a slack one. But we believe that the attempt must fall short of its goal and a miss is as good as a mile.

Why must the attempt fall short of its goal? The reason is this: the will which attempts to will goodness alone and eliminate evil is itself a mixed thing, both good and evil. Thus all that it does partakes of its mixed nature, even the attempt to purify itself and do away with mixed good and evil conduct. It is a case of the water trying to rise above its source. The will which attempts to break up the fatal identification of divine and human itself lives upon that identification. It cannot lift itself by its own bootstraps.

The thing to do therefore is to set the will aside, to give it up, to refuse longer to trust in it. The requirement is not to live by the will but to die to it.

It is precisely this dying to the human will which is the greatest significance of Christ. It is because he set the will aside that he is The Incarnate one.

There is no doubt that the death of Christ, which symbolizes and expresses his death to his will, has been regarded as the center of his significance by the great sweep of Christian history. There is no doubt that St. Paul so regarded it and he is very likely the supreme interpreter of Christianity. Beyond this, I believe this conviction of the supreme importance of Christ's death lives even in the earliest Gospels and particularly in Mark, the earliest of all. It is a fact that fifty per cent of Mark's space is given up to the Passion narrative. That gives an idea of its importance to him. It is likely that the Passion story was crystallized and perhaps written even before Mark and that it was the first part of the Gospel story to be thus developed. This shows where the earliest tradition laid the emphasis.

In Mark's Gospel there are three predictions of the death of Christ (8:31; 9:31; 10:33-34). In a document as carefully worked out as this one, such repetition points to the utmost solemnity. It points to the inevitability of the coming death and suggest that it is a meaning and not simply an event. It is interesting to note the first of these predictions. St. Peter has just proclaimed Jesus to be the Messiah. This is as far as most of us get. Immediately thereafter Jesus cautions him to be quiet about the Messiahship. Evidently there is something questionable about it. Then he proclaims his death. This he spoke openly. At this point Peter takes hold of him and begins to reprove him. Far from being central in his idea of Messiahship, death did not enter it at all. Then Jesus, addressing him as Satan, told him to get behind him. And why? His words are, "Thou savorest not the things of God but the things of man." In a word, death is the essence of God's idea of Messiahship and the idea of living on and trying to perfect life is man's idea.

Just as Mark connects the death of Christ with the Messiahship and finds him Messiah because he is willing to die, so luke connects the death with another very important event. The important event is the Transfiguration. You remember in that story Moses and Elijah appear and talk with Jesus. Mark has that detail but he does not tell what they talk about. Luke says that they "spake of his decease which he was about to accomplish at Jerusalem." (Luke 9:31) In Luke's mind then, Christ was transfigured with heavenly glory because he is Messiah and because he is about to offer his life. And in Luke's mind his death is approved by Moses who represents the Law and Elijah who represents the prophets.

It would be ridiculous so say that the life of Jesus had no significance. It had great significance. But we may make two decisions about this life. It was less significant than the death. Second, such significance as it had was connected with his death.

Speaking of his life, I would begin by saying that he lived a perfect life in this world. I think I would have to add immediately that in order to stay alive in the real world he had to make some compromises or adjustments, shall we call them. But even so, a perfect life was not his primary mandate. His chief mandate was to give up life. Why? Because men needed to die to their wills. In order to make this possible some one had to lead the way, to establish the type

and to empower men to die to their wills. So that the greatest thing about Jesus was not his perfect life; it was his willingness to give up that perfect life. Thus his whole life was devoted to death and a preparation for it. The virtue and the value in his life was his willingness to accept death.

With this in mind we can say a word about his life. In the first place he had to preserve his resolution to give up his own will and do so for the right motive. He had to do this so that his death, when it came, would have saving quality and not simply be a regretable tragedy. Second, he had to present such a challenge to his people—the chosen of God—that they could enter into life by accepting it, or they could reject it and thus show that the best human conduct is itself the problem. Third, he had to set up the divine requirements of life, the requirements which the men of this world must violate and which Christians delight to do. This refers to his teachings. Fourth, he must gather together the group who would stay with him till death on almost any terms and would follow him after death for the right reason. All of these activities look to his death which, in turn, completes them.

It would be represensible not to say that the purpose of this death was life. First, Jesus offered himself unto death in order that God could bring him forth from the dead. In this new life, after death, a new will is given in which the old attempt to identify God and man does not reappear. Second, men are through their faith admitted to a share of this resurrection life of Jesus and they too know something of life in which they no longer corrupt the incarnation in them. Even in this life this miracle takes place and it visibly affects conduct.

IV.

How the final portrait of Jesus was painted.

When the Gospels were written the experience of being saved by Jesus' death was known by many. It was to spread this experience that the Gospels were written. Thus the death of Christ was the foundation stone of the Gospels, the beginning not the end. For this reason the Gospels were "second thoughts" as we say, a *re-interpretation* of the life of Jesus in the light of his death.

The writers look back over the old days. They show how the disciples began with a very slender idea of the nature of Jesus and his purpose. Gradually this idea develops but there were some gross misunderstandings too. Some of these were cleared away. Others were not dissipated until after the Resurrection.

Meanwhile, the Gospel writers say, even in the days of his flesh Jesus knew who he was and he was sure of his purpose. He knew himself to be Messiah and knew that the essence of his Messiahship was his self-sacrificing death. Whatever men thought of him, whatever even the disciples thought, he was even in those days the Savior and Son of God.

But they did not stop with his life. They went back to his boyhood and even to his infancy. Even in the stable at Bethlehem he was the Savior and the Son of God, for the end is present in the beginning. It is obvious that when men say such things of a baby they are reading back in the light of subsequent events. I would make the same point about the whole life of Jesus as found in the Gospels. The thing the evangelists tell about Jesus and the way they

tell it are both dictated by all that they have known him to be. If we remember this we understand the rightness of seeing the whole of the Christ in the Babe of Bethlehem. It was necessary to call his name Jesus, for he was indeed the Savior. It was necessary to tell his mother that a sword would pierce her heart, for he would die painfully and shamefully. It was right for shepherds and kings to adore him for he was truly God's gift to the mighty and to the lowly.

Nor were the writers of the New Testament content to stop with his birth. They traced his life back into the heavens before he was born, back till the time when the thing which later became incarnate in him still lived in the life of God. This too must be reckoned with if we want a full picture of Jesus. Hear the majestic words: "Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus: who being in the form of God, counted not the being on an equality with God a thing to be held on too, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the cross. Wherefore also God highly exalted him and gave unto him a name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the father." (Phil. 2:5-11.)

THE BRITISH POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS SITUATION

By ALAN RICHARDSON

It is impossible to describe the difference in what is sometimes called the "feeling-tone" of English life between the period of the twelve months before Midsummer 1941 and the present time. Externally the conditions of living are harder today than they were then; although there is enough food to maintain health and vigour, it tends to be monotonous and imposes a strain on the housewife and caterer to make rations go as far as possible; fuel is short to the point of discomfort (but no shorter than that); private motoring has ceased altogether, and travel is generally crowded and inconvenient. But, despite all that and much more, the English scene is a good deal more cheerful than it was. The events of June 22nd and December 7th, 1941, have altered the outlook for the better in a way that it is hard even for us fully to appreciate. It is not merely or mainly a difference of material circumstance; the real difference is *moral.* The sense of utter isolation which was so oppressive in the days between the fall of France and the attack on Russia has disappeared. It is probably not possible for anyone who did not live here through the period when Britain stood alone, with no allies except a few refugee governments in London, to imagine what it means now to belong to the great and strong company of the "United Nations."

During the year before Russia was invaded Britain had been sustained not only materially but also morally by American sympathy. Probably Americans themselves do not realize how much their moral support meant to the more thoughtful element of the British population. At a time when even the most convinced believers in the British cause could not but question sometimes whether this was not just a war in defense of British Imperialism and the old order of things, the consciousness that those elements of American opinion which we most highly valued believed that we were right was a powerful source of moral confidence. In particular, a small but not entirely uninfluential section of Christian opinion in Britain received great encouragement from the attitude of the group behind *Christianity and Society* and later *Christianity and Crisis.* I do not think that this debt has been adequately acknowledged, and I doubt whether the fact is appreciated by Christians in America as it ought to be. Here was a group, well known for its radical thinking on social matters and for its concern about international justice, a group which could be expected to have preserved some degree of neutral impartiality, which yet encouraged us to believe that in continuing the struggle after France had fallen we were doing right. Such moral support, we shall always remember, came from America, not from Russia; and it was a Christian analysis, not a Marxist one, which upheld us in the struggle against aggression, and

which helped us to stand firm at a dramatic moment in the historical crisis of the twentieth century.

Today Britain is no longer in the limelight as she was in the summer and autumn of 1940. The heroic defenders of Stalingrad occupy the centre of the stage, and eyes are turned to the vast areas of the Pacific which once were focussed on the Dover cliffs. Life in Britain is not so tense, but it is still strenuous; one gains from every quarter the impression that Britain is working very hard. The whole island is converted into a workshop, and the people of Britain, we are told, have a higher output of war material per head of the population than any other nation in the world. Many women are doing the work of men and most men who are not in the forces are doing the work of two; and in the evening and at the week-ends (if they have any!) they exercise with the Home Guard or take their part in the Civilian Defense services. A new sense of social solidarity and a new opportunity for community service have been born as a result of the exigencies of defense. In many villages and residential areas disintegration had before 1939 proceeded so far, through the lack of any common purpose, as to make the idea of "neighbourhood" almost meaningless; today we have witnessed a revival of the community spirit which results from the pursuit of a common task. In almost every village or "dormitory area" isolated individuals have found "community" again. They have mixed with people from three or four houses away, talked with them, worked with them—people whose very names they did not know before the war began! In the Home Guard and A.R.P. services distinctions of class have disappeared and the "fellowship of the trenches" experienced by many who were in the 1914-18 war has come alive again in their own home district. The hope of a re-integrated community life has reappeared and is most obvious in those areas where the dangers are greatest. It would be easy to exaggerate the significance of these developments, and it would seem that there is nothing to prevent them from collapsing when the dangers of invasion or bombing disappear, just as "the fellowship of the trenches" vanished after the last war. But as any rate while it lasts the experience is real enough; leaders of the community enterprise are forthcoming, often inept and inexperienced as they are, and tasks are there for them to do. In our village this week a series of lectures and demonstrations for Fire Guard leaders is being arranged in the school—nearly every evening and on Saturday afternoon. A written examination and practical tests will complete the course, and then the members of the various area-groups will turn out together and practice putting out incendiaries! This kind of thing may sound childish, and indeed some of the arrangements are often puerile, but it should be remembered that we are not, after all, just playing a game. The Free Church of the village and several houses lie in ruins as the result of a previous visit from the *Luftwaffe.*

Thus, we see in our own experience in an English village the truth of several of E. H. Carr's remarks in his *Conditions of Peace.* War has given to English society a sense of purpose, from the lack of which it was rapidly dying not so long ago: it has given us "a deliberate avowed moral purpose, involving the call for common sacrifice for a recognized common good." This purpose runs through all the strata of the civilian population,

and the old distinction between the home front and the fighting services has in some essential respects disappeared. War has brought revival in many spheres—the cure of unemployment, agriculture, social life; the question which Carr poses is in the minds of many thoughtful people: what will happen after the war? "British leadership has hitherto been found wanting in the capacity to harness the national revival to any purpose less transitory and less negative than the defeat of Hitler." War has shown us that economic problems are not insoluble, as we used to think they were. "War is at the present time the most purposeful of our social institutions"—even in the life of a village! This is the supreme problem before our generation: "We cannot escape from war until we have found some other moral purpose powerful enough to generate self-sacrifice on the scale requisite to enable civilization to survive."

This is a serious question and it is being seriously faced, especially by educationists and those responsible for the leadership of youth. It doubtless underlies the very great interest in the whole question of education which is now evinced on every side. Some, forgetting that one cannot cast out Beelzebub by means of Beelzebub, seem to wish to introduce some form of compulsory youth training scheme, but on the whole totalitarian methods are widely disliked. The government itself seems to be committed to the principle of backing the voluntary societies, clubs, etc., rather than starting grandiose State schemes; but one of the difficulties confronting the Church organizations and the voluntary organizations generally is that they cannot take full advantage of the offers already made, since most of the likeliest leaders of youth and club activities are either in the forces or are giving all their "leisure" time to civilian defense. Church leaders are well aware of the problem of supplying the "moral purpose" which is acknowledged to be necessary, but no obvious solution presents itself. A mere "return to religion" movement would not solve the problem; Church life has become such a departmental affair, covering such a small part of the lives of even loyal Church members, that existing parochial machinery is useless to cope with the situation. The problem of making the Word take flesh again in the community-life of Christian laity, to say nothing of the masses who do not go to Church at all, is unquestionably one of the most urgent issues confronting our Churches today, set as they are in a secular society, disintegrating but now partially reintegrated by the exigencies of war. In any case it is not easy to see where the Church comes into the picture of our partially revived community life, unless it is prepared to become just one organization amongst many, *gleichgeschaltet* with the rest, serving a purpose which (however necessary at the moment) cannot be a permanent purpose and in any case is not the distinctive purpose of the *Christian* society. It is too fatally easy for the less intelligent Church spokesmen to take up the cry of waging a war in defense of "Christian principles." If Church leaders are content with this attitude, then they can join in the great march of the people into battle, beating their drums in the rhythm of the nation's footsteps, and pretending that they are leading when they are really trotting alongside, as children do when a company of soldiers marches down the street.

On the whole it is true to say that Church leaders are not content with such

an attitude; they march with the nation, it is true, because they sincerely believe (for the most part) that the cause of the United Nations is right. But thoughtful Christians realize at once that it is not their whole duty simply to keep step with the nation as it marches to war. "I went with the multitude," says the Psalmist, and it is easy enough to do that; but the Psalmist adds, "and brought them forth into the house of God"—which makes all the difference. It is this difference which causes the more thoughtful Christian leaders a considerable amount of anxiety just now. The clergy can still preach on Sundays to the faithful few (provided that they are not at a Home Guard instruction); but what does Christian community mean on week-days? How is a common purpose, greater than the negative one of defeating Hitler, to be grafted into revival of community which the war has begun? A common purpose holds together the United Nations, but it is a negative purpose, not a specifically Christian one. Indeed, some heart-burning has been caused by prominent British statesmen, like Lord Halifax and Sir Samuel Hoare, who have quite sincerely declared that the war is being fought in defense of Christian principles. Naturally our Turkish friends and our Russian allies do not quite like this way of putting it—any more than we should like to be told that the war is being fought in defense of Marxist or Hindu or liberal-rationalist principles; yet these statements would be just as true as those of Halifax and Hoare. English laymen, no matter how sincerely religious they are, are not given to expressing their convictions in adequately defined theological language, and they usually hold that theology is of doubtful value and in any case is not for them; here we have an instance of confused theological thinking which might have unfortunate international consequences! The war is being fought in defense of principles of which Christians must approve, but these principles (the four freedoms, and so on) are not distinctively Christian; most of the political thinkers of pagan antiquity, such as Cicero, would have approved of them wholeheartedly. All this illustrates the point that we have not yet shown Christian laymen where the distinctively Christian revelation is to be embodied in the life of the twentieth century.

This problem is easier to state than to solve. Meanwhile it would be easy to overlook what the churches are doing, because what they are not doing is so conspicuous. The churches rarely get the credit for such contributions as they actually make to the right development of things. Take, for instance, the case of British sympathy for China (we might have taken India, but that would have raised other issues too big to be treated incidentally in a short article). A large part of what the British public as a whole (as distinct from the relatively small number of readers of the more serious dailies and weeklies) knows about China is the result of Christian missionary education at home. There is shockingly little in most newspapers about China, and there is little attempt made to educate the man in the street on the subject of this most important foundation-stone of present strategy and future peace-building. But the churches, being alive to their missionary task, realized the importance of China long before the British Government ever did; and today church groups study China (reading such excellent books for the purpose as Ronald Rees's *China Can Take It,* Edinburgh

House Press, or the other excellent and informative pamphlets and booklets issued by that Press); speakers address all sorts of Church meetings, and so on. These studies and talks are not old-fashioned addresses about saving souls in China, but deal with the whole impact of the Christian Gospel on Chinese life and aspirations. Christian leaders have played an important part in setting up organizations in this country for China aid or relief; Bishop R. O. Hall of Hong-Kong, who has recently been here on a visit, has taken a lion's share in the task. Here is just one example of the way in which the Church's work of aducation for world Christian community is an important factor in the urgent task of shaping public opinion. Twice since the present war started the British Student Christian Movement has had a Chinese as a full-time member of its staff. In this matter of contact with China the Christian Church has been preparing for "world reconstruction" for a long time, in the proper way in which the Church should prepare for it, that is, in her normal and effective course of preaching the Gospel.

There is in Britain at present a great interest in the problems of society and a sincere desire to achieve a new and higher ideal of social justice. How far this is a passing enthusiasm generated by the heat of the moment we cannot tell. All sorts of public men and statesmen make speeches which assume that we are in the middle of a revolution in which "privilege" and "injustice" are being swept away. It is hard to say how far the public generally accepts these speeches at their face value, or whether it just listens uncritically and believes it all. No one doubts the sincerity of some at least of the speakers. The Archbishop of Canterbury is accepted as the spokesman of all the churches on these subjects and his influence and popularity are enormous. It is a long time since a high ecclesiastic has been a national figure whose photographs and utterances are found in almost every newspaper one picks up! One cannot be too grateful that such a man in such an official position should be so established in the nation's regard. His address at the "Malvern" follow-up meeting in the Albert Hall on September 26th, when he shared the platform with the Archbishop of York and Sir Stafford Cripps, has been widely reported and we need not enlarge on it here. There is, however, one question which is raised which deserves comment.

Whereas most public men when they talk about "justice" and "reconstruction" shelter themselves behind generalities, the Archbishop made a quite specific proposal for social change. Briefly, he suggested that the lending-power of the banks should be eliminated to the amount deposited by their clients, and that the issue of new credit should be the function of a public authority. We have now reached a stage, he argued, where money (or credit) has become a monopoly and should therefore be taken over by the State. (Dr. Temple was doubtless thinking rather of the post-war world than of today, when bank profits are liable to a hundred per cent Excess Profit Duty if they exceed pre-war levels and when in any case the banks act mainly as agents for the Government.) The interesting point is here that a high ecclesiastical dignitary was making a specific proposal involving a technical as well as a moral judgment. Of course, he was told by all sorts of irate correspondents in the columns of various newspapers

that it was not an Archbishop's job to run the country's banking system and he was advised to stick to his "spiritual" office. The question is thus immediately raised whether moral issues can be separated from technical ones, and whether Christian leaders have any right to mention technical matters. During the last twenty years (as Carr points out) we have had an exaggerated belief in the supremacy of intellect and have imagined that the happy solution of our problems would sooner or later be reached by "experts." The "key" to our economic problem, it is supposed, is discoverable by studious economists in the technique of credit-manipulation or something else. Once the experts have determined the right course of action, men will naturally pursue it. This is a modern (though old) form of *laissez-faire.* The Archbishop's proposal challenged this assumption and suggested that moral principles involved making up one's mind on technical issues. What the world wants is not so much "experts" as leaders.

But there is plenty of room here for disagreement among Christians. Even those who dissent from the line of action which Dr. Temple proposed will probably be glad that he proposed it, thereby challenging the assumption that moral decisions must wait upon expert discovery—perhaps for ever or at any rate too long. *The London Times* of September 29th, 1942, contained an interesting sign of the changed outlook of today; under the heading "City Notes" in the sacrosanct "Finance and Commerce" column, there appeared the subheadline: "The Archbishop and the Banks." There followed a serious and reasonable criticism of Dr. Temple's specific proposals, in which certain difficulties were mentioned. The writer did not seem to disagree in principle with what the Archbishop desired, but he thought that, though there may well be need for special cerdit institutions after the war, there seems little point in not making full use of the credit machinery already to hand. Some Christians, knowledgeable in matters of finance, including some ordained men who are trained in economics, have expressed agreement with the *Times* writer rather than with the Archbishop on the technical issue. But the significant point lies in the fact that a Church leader of Dr. Temple's prestige and authority should have broken with the convention that Christians must leave all technical matters to the "experts" and thus render themselves comparatively innocuous by confining their attention to "moral principles" which they can "understand." A democratic society requires citizens who will seriously grapple with technical issues, as Dr. Temple has done, and fearlessly pronounce judgment upon them.

A leader of European Christianity has recently bidden us pray that we may not pass through these days unchanged. God's judgments are in the earth, and now is the time for the inhabitants thereof to learn righteousness. There are signs that people in all walks of life are being quite decisively changed by the course of events. If one picks up a book like *The Last Enemy* by Richard Hillary (Macmillan), one can see from this moving and honest record of a Spitfire-pilot's experiences through and after the Battle of Britain something of what is happening to the young men who went up to Oxford shortly before 1939 imagining that the world was at their feet. Or if one picks up the book of a scholar, as different as a book could be from the one just mentioned, such as C. N. Coch-

rane's *Christianity and Classical Culture* (Oxford: finished just before the outbreak of the war), one will there find how having lived through the twenty years between the wars has illuminated the study of ancient history, so that one can live again through the political and social problems which confronted statesmen and churchmen from Augustus to Augustine. In varying degrees the lessons of our twentieth century crisis are being learned. The impact of the crisis upon theological thought in Britain today is striking though it should not be surprising; but that is too long a story to embark upon now. One summary observation may be permitted and with it we must conclude. To live through such a crisis makes us understand better what the Bible is talking about, for the great moments of biblical history were also moments of crisis, when Israel's history became the vehicle of "sacred history." First, there was the crisis of the Exodus from Egypt, in which the vocation of Israel was stamped indelibly upon the nation's consciousness in a series of striking catastrophes. Secondly, there was the extended period of crisis lasting from Amos to Haggai and Zechariah, the crisis of the Exile, in which the great prophets of Israel did their work. Finally, there was the crisis *par excellence,* when "the prince of this world was judged," when a New Israel emerged to carry out the divine plan which old Israel had rejected. In each crisis something was lost, but much was gained. The biblical pattern is discovered again in the great crisis of Christian history: in the days of St. Augustine, in the sixteenth century, during the Napoleonic wars when a missionary vocation was re-born. On the other side of the judgment of the twentieth century stands the promise of a world-wide oecumenical Christianity. Small wonder that some of us in Britain today find the atmosphere of our times exhilarating and with the soldier-poet of 1914 return thanks to God who has matched us with His hour.

OBEDIENCE AND JUSTICE

By PAUL LEHMANN

The concern for integrity and the concern for relevance are perennially decisive for Christians who try to take the gospel seriously in a world in which the gospel has continually to be affirmed. The question of the integrity of Christian decision is a theological question. It has to do with the kind of thinking which the affirmation of the gospel occasions and requires in the world. The question of the relevance of Christian decision is an ethical question. It has to do with the motive and the expectation, the norm and the direction of action in the world. For Christians, ethical questions cannot be delineated by reflection upon the general nature of man and the world, as rationalism does; nor by reflection upon societal evolution, as naturalism does. For Christians, ethical questions are also theological questions. They are delineated by reflection upon the gospel affirmation that as a matter of fact, God is revealed in Jesus Christ as God and Savior. It is the province of a theological ethic to explore and to explain the sense in which the gospel is related to the concrete issues of life in the world.

Now the critical categories of a theological ethic are obedience and justice. Obedience defines the motive and the aim with which Christians act in the world. If the gospel is "the power of God unto salvation," it must be regarded as imposing upon the world an order to which the world must be confronted and as supplying the possibilities for this conformity. Obedience is the acceptance of this demand for conformity between the world of the gospel(redemption) and the world in which the gospel is affirmed (creation and sin) as the necessary point of departure for and purpose of activity in the world as it actually is. Justice defines the norm and the direction of the activity of Christians in the world. If the gospel is "the power of God unto salvation," it must be regarded as the act whereby God sets right what is wrong in the world. Justice is the recognition of this act as the measure of every concrete situation in which the conflict between the power and direction of sin and the power and direction of the God revealed in Christ is decisive. Obedience and justice, therefore, are the critical ethical categories because they express the sense in which the gospel is related to the concrete issues of life in the world.

The social revolution through which we are now passing continues to underscore the fact that the Christian mind is dark about its duty. Its immediate resources for this evil present seem to have been a fairly simple view of the gospel as a love ideal which men ought to be and could be persuaded to make their own. Christians were to work for the restraint and the correction of the inequalities that divided men in their private and public life. This was a labor of justice which did not seem to be inconsonant with the ideal of love so long as the actual tensions under which men lived did not precipitate or promise violence. The line between the gospel and the world was a continuous one, fundamentally un-

affected either by theological or by social complexities. Since revelation has become an ideal, possible of achievement in the world, the mandatory character of obedience had become volitional and the guilt of injustice a painful regret. It is not strange, therefore, that the actual outbreak of violence should have found Christians, lay and clerical alike (though, dei providentia et hominum confusione, mostly clerical) profoundly moved by the fact that their failures had overtaken their hopes, but unshaken in their resolution to pursue the same course. On the other hand, there were those who had light enough to see that the dawn lay rather on the farther than the nearer side of doom. They recognized that the correction of injustice was a matter of the tenuous balance of power between contending forces in any given moment of decision. History could not be rescued from the abyss of meaninglessness by the cultivation of desire under the inspiration of the ideal of love. It needed frankly to be apprehended as the scene of struggle between what was possible though partial and what was impossible though ultimate. The gospel had to be brought within the more penetrating (as against the more patient) gaze of the prophetic appraisal of the struggle of history as the working out of a divine purpose of love within the nearer framework of judgment and mercy. Love was still an ideal. This was evident from the fact that it was always a factor in human decision. But it has become a law as well, which claimed men for what they could not achieve as surely as for what they could. The relation between the gospel and the world was still continuous but it had become dialectical. A recovered dimension of height and depth had come to intersect the length and breadth of things so that the point of intersection (as against the progress of process) became the significant point in determining the integrity and the relevance of Christian decision. Intersection meant that every historical situation had to be estimated with regard to a transcendent demand of revelation and a contingent context of action, both interrelated in such a way as to make the conjuncture of rational ends and technical means the actual, though qualified, expression of Chrisitan duty. This way of thinking restored the mandatory character of obedience to its full strength as a demand inherent in the gospel not a desire of the heart, and it ruled out regret in favor of repentance as the only appropriate response to the guilt of injustice. Such a view was, therefore, better calculated from the first to prepare the Christian mind for the outbreak of violence by renewing its appreciation of those theological implications of the gospel which gave point and promise to the constant ethical equilibrium between achievement and frustration. When justice is overtaken by injustice and iniquity is rampant over goodness, then frustration is significant only as sin and achievement is credible only as grace. The history is purposeful only as judgment and possible only as forgiveness.

The critical question is whether the integrity and the relevance of Christian decision can be defined in this way without surrendering integrity to relevance. It is quite plain that the simple continuity between the gospel and the world has deprived contemporary Christians of the sense for the specific and the vital orientation of their actions in the world. They do not know whether there is or whether there ought to be a Christian thing to do in any given moment. Since an ideal

cannot be obeyed but only desired, every approximation to that ideal must be regarded either as a more significant achievement than it actually is or as a less relevant achievement than it actually is. And this does not make for incisively Christian decision. On the other hand, the dialectical continuity between the gospel and the world has pointed for many Christians a way of making concrete decisions amidst the shifting complexities of modern life while at the same time recognizing that the motives and the expectations of such decisions are derived from the insights of the gospel. There is a Christian thing to do in any given moment but what is done in any given moment is only the partial execution of what ought to be done. Obedience is the unqualified demand of the gospel upon every situation. But there is also a determinable possibility in every situation which can be defined as the concrete form of obedience. Indeed, it must be so defined if the demand of the gospel is to be relevant to the contingent context of action in the world. This possibility is justice.

The critical difficulty arises, however, at the point of the determination of justice. Can one maintain the integrity of Christian decision by a theological definition of the motive and the aim of action without being strictly theological about the definition of the norm and the direction of ethical action? Can the uncompromising character of obedience be derived from the gospel whereas the compromising character of justice is derived from the general nature of the rational and moral life. It can be, to be sure. And the history of Christian thought knows a very persistent and persuasive way of doing so. This is the doctrine of natural law which Christian thinkers borrowed from an alien culture when the delay in the coming of the kingdom introduced an acute tension between the integrity and the relevance of the Christian faith amidst the concrete issues of life. But what about the price of this procedure? It is the abandonment of the attempt to explore and to explain the relation between revelation and the concrete issues of life in the world from the side of revelation.

Whenever the norm of ethical action is derived from the general nature of the rational and moral life, the concern for the relevance of Christian decision has overtaken the concern for its integrity. The fact that God is revealed in Jesus Christ as God and Savior is the regulative factor in such decision or it is not a genuine factor at all. The ethical dialectic of the gospel is not a dialectic between a transcendent demand of revelation and a rationally determined norm of justice to which ethical failure and ethical achievement are respectively to be referred. The ethical dialectic of the gospel is, on the contrary, a dialectic between a God whose act of self-revelation has disclosed Him both as Lord and Savior and men whose acts are never acts of obedience and justice yet who never disavow the demand to obey and to do justly. It does not follow that the alternative to a rationally determined form of justice is an ethically irrelevant acceptance of the demand for obedience imposed by revelation. Neither does it follow that an irrationally derived faith commits the believer to the abandonment of critical intelligence with respect to the determination of his course of action in the world. The theological dialectic of the gospel is an exposition of the irreconcilable elements in the divine self-revelation which faith discerns

as fact. The ethical aspects of this dialectic are those aspects which pertain to the concrete issues which a critical intelligence discerns as fact. A critical intelligence which is also a believing intelligence will always find it difficult but will never find it impossible to relate the insights of the gospel to the technical possibilities in any given moment of decision. A critical intelligence which is also a believing intelligence will be guided not by the continuous but by the discontinuous relation between the gospel and the world. There is a discontinuity between the gospel and the world because the gospel fact that God is revealed in Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior is neither discernible in nor derivable from the context of things in the world. This discontinuity defines the conflicting complexity of circumstance as the nexus of broken possibilities which remain possibilities not because they express partial ethical achievements but because they have been healed from without.

One illustration may suffice to suggest how faith may claim intelligence for the doing of its duty in the world. Believing in this discontinuity, a Christian who is a member of the Board of Economic Warfare will be guided by a number of considerations which will make a profound difference in the motive and the aim, the norm and the direction of the judgements and decisions that govern his work. He will know that the unavoidable mandate for this work comes not from the commander-in-chief of a nation at war but from the gospel demand that because God is Lord and Savior of the world all who believe must take up the burden of the world where and when it confronts them and move against the burden of the world as faith requires and intelligence directs. Intelligence will tell him, for instance, that the Latin-American relations of this country are of incalculable strategic importance for the well-being and the peace of the citizens of both continents and that imperialistic economic arrangements are not designed to further such well-being and peace. His faith will tell him that the fruits of the earth are not the property of the strong but of the people of the earth and that his duty is to bring heart and mind and soul and strength to bear against any such economic arrangements. He will be troubled by, but not afraid of compromise, because he will know from experience that compromise is a fact and from his faith that this fact is sin, a sin which lies beyond redemption, not in so far as men engage in it, but only in so far as they acquiesce in it. Of such well-doing he will not grow weary for he will neither overestimate his achievements not underestimate his failures. He will not need a rational demonstration that some justice has been done nor will he need a religious reminder that there is more justice still to be achieved. He will know that to act as though God has Himself acted as Lord and Savior in the world is to obey and to set himself against the sinful powers of his time, as they confront him, is to do justly. For such a man justice is the norm and the direction of obedience and obedience is the motive and the aim of justice because the gospel is regulative of the practical issues of life in the world. The judgments which he makes and the decisions which he takes will, therefore, be governed by his faith. For such a man the struggles of men derive their significance from the struggle of God and he will understand that the grace of God is made perfect in weakness. Obedience and justice belong to the

world from the creation. But they are genuinely relevant in a world of sin only in so far as Christians think and act in the light of the fact that this world has been redeemed.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Carl Mayer is Professor of Sociology at the New School for Social Research. His article was delivered as one of the addresses in the fall meeting of the Fellowship, and prompted a very lively discussion.

Clifford Stanley has recently become Rector of St. Peter's Episcopal Church, St. Louis, Missouri.

Alan Richardson is Educational Secretary of the British Christian Student Movement, and the representative of Christianity and Society in Great Britain. He has been a constant friend and collaborator.

Paul Lehmann is Associate Professor of Biblical Literature at Wellesley College.

THE FUTURE OF OUR JOURNAL

With this issue we are beginning the eighth year of our life as a quarterly devoted to the discussion of social and political problems from the standpoint of a radical Christian realism. We have gained a very loyal group of supporters in this period, which have made it possible for us to survive, though the number of our readers is relatively small.

We would appreciate additional help from those who believe that our journal is worthwhile, in bringing it to the attention of others. Will you send your copy to a friend who might become interested in it? Will you send us gift subscriptions? Or will you send us names of people to whom we might send sample copies. We need 150 more subscribers to be fully self-supporting.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE, *by Max Werner.* The Viking Press, $3.00.

STRATEGY FOR VICTORY, *by Hanson Baldwin.* Norton, $1.75.

"The Great Offensive" is a careful, scientific study of the course of the war to date, with special emphasis on the German Soviet War, and a plan for the further conduct of the war, based on this study. It is perhaps the most competent survey of the military aspects of the war open to the general reader. "Strategy for Victory" is more of a popular book. Despite it's form it is based on the solid studies of the dean of American military critics and is thoroughly trustworthy. While both writers have a firm hold on the basic problem, Baldwin thinks and writes from an American point of view whereas Werner has a more European or even world outlook.

The writers are agreed on their main tenets as may be shown by a few examples. Both writers hold that the main foe is Germany rather than Japan and that Germany must be dealt with first, Japan meanwhile being restrained as much as possible. Werner says bluntly that the army of Japan is second rate and not really a modern army at all. Baldwin, a graduate of Annapolis and inclined to see things more in terms of sea power, tends to rate Japan more highly. The difference of outlook appears further in the contemplated strategy for vanquishing Japan. Baldwin foresees an assault centered on a ship-plane movement based on Hawaii and directed toward metropolitan Japan. Werner inclines to a land-air assault based on China and Siberia. In such an undertaking the main role of America would be to provide the planes and tanks. Russia and particularly China, would supply the masses needed for such a land offensive.

Again, both writers manifest a like balance when it comes to the employment of arms. They do not think, for example, that air power will win the war. They both declare that the great offensive must use land, sea and air power. Werner denies that the tank-plane team has nullified the role of land masses and infantry. Baldwin denies that planes have superseded surface vessels in the realm of sea power. Both writers manifest a like balance in dealing with offensive and defensive war. They are agreed that the winning of the war requires offensive action but they do not underrate the power of defense and they insist on its appropriate function.

They are agreed, third, that victory requires an attack upon the land mass of Europe. They are solidly for the "second front." Further they are agreed that because of the presence of naval and air bases and because of the shortness of lines of communication the logical place for the offensive is France. Werner apparently thinks that such a thrust is possible now or in the near future. Baldwin considers that only a limited operation is possible this year. Werner points out that a seizure of North Africa would be full of disconcerting possibilities, an interesting suggestion in view of recent events.

Werner deals at some length with the problems of coalition warfare. He says, truly, that for a considerable time we

have had on the United Nation's side not one but three wars, imperfectly coalesced. In a genuine coalition, Russia will supply the mass army, Britain, sea and air power and the basic manpower of the second front. America will provide sea and air power, the reserves for the second front and, above all, the weapons and energies of war.

Probably the most interesting feature of Werner's book is his study of the German-Soviet war. It will doubtless be a classic on the subject for some time to come. He maintains that this is the first truly modern war in the sense that both contestants are rich in modern weapons and tactics. He says that the Russian war plan is better and more realistic than the German and that it has been more faithfully adhered to. He estimates that the Russians have weakened the German strength by thirty to forty percent. The encouragement to be found in his conclusions is equalled only by the care with which they were made.

Clifford L. Stanley.

THE WORLD AFTER THE WAR, *by Henry Bamford Parkes.* Crowell Co. $2.50.

Of the many books on post-war problems this is undoubtedly one of the best, though it modestly refrains from giving exact blueprints and is content to analyze general principles of world reconstruction. The author believes that "if conceptions of justice were excluded from politics" life would not be worth living; but that on the other hand "it is only by the exercise of power that men can enjoy the security which makes justice possible." On the basis of that general and convincing conception of the relation of power to justice he analyzes the task of bringing security into international life. I know of no abler refutation of proposals to federate nations along continental lines, or of the idea of federal union. The author rightly regards a European continental federation as impossible because Germany would have to be the center of it; and the hatreds which the Nazis have engendered would make this impossible. An American hemispheric federation, he believes, lacks cultural, geographic and economic bases. He refutes Streits proposals by proving that a mere union of the so-called democratic nations would not suffice to establish a wide enough system of mutual security.

He is convinced that any post-war international system must rest primarily upon a mutual accord between the four dominant powers, Britain, America, Russia and China and he discusses the possible sources of friction between them and the possibility and necessity of mutual accord among them with great wisdom and political astuteness. The only weakness in his analysis lies in his failure to deal fully with the problem of establishing instruments through which this powerful hegemony can be checked in the interest of justice to the smaller nations.

R. N.

DEVANT LA CRISE MONDIALE. Manifestea de Catholiques Europeens Sejournant en Amerique. Editions de la Maison Francaise. New York 1942. 49 pp. $1.00.

This tiny volume (reprinted in English translation in "The Commonweal" of August 21, 1942) can claim a certain authority by virtue of the fact that 42 distinguished Catholics from various European countries, who now reside in this country, have joined its author, Jacques Maritain, in signing it. They comprise, among others, the statesmen

Aguirre, de Kerrilis, Sturzo, and van Zeeland, the political scientists Gurian, Hula, Kolnai, and de Ropp, the philosophers von Hildebrandt and Baudouin Schwarz, and the poets Alfred Noyes and Sigrid Undset. One would have liked to see excluded from this illustrious group so questionable a political character as Zernatto and to see included a man like Briefs.

The general principles as expounded in the booklet are excellent. A non-Catholic can only admire and envy the naturalness of the transition from religious axioms to social principles when he reads: "Our faith makes it a duty for us, . . . in social life, to give it such institutions as are proper for Christian societies and condition the spiritual life of the individuals," or "this is a war of civilization, and for this reason, . . . also a religious war." Such insight into the social character of the Christian life and the Christian presuppositions of society deservedly give Catholic thinking its vigor and persuasiveness to this day. The manifesto is emphatic in declaring that "there is no more pernicious illusion than to imagine that it is possible to Christianize totalitarianism." Although some of the contributors believe that after the present European disorganization "a particularly vigorous political authority will be necessary," all are agreed on a number of far-reaching demands. The dignity of man and the freedom of his conscience must be guaranteed. Workers and peasants must have a greater share in decisions and responsibilities. A paternal or corporate state is regarded as no solution for the pressing problem of giving the economic groups and forces an adequate representation in modern society. The liberty of groups, inferior to the state, is declared as fundamental as the dignity of the person in any social reconstruction. It is emphasized that the groups must only be coordinated by the state and must not be constituted by it. The manifesto declares for the abridgment of the sovereignty of states. It is rather remarkable to have in a Catholic statement a genuine tribute to the ideals of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" and a recognition of the fact that, though the French revolution interpreted them in an anti-Christian sense, they can easily be reconciled with the Christian faith for the simple reason that they are derived from a Christian understanding of the world.

It would be nice if one could report that this group of high-minded and intelligent Catholics understood the very similar relation between the communist program and Christian doctrine. But on this crucial point the manifesto falls far short of what advanced Catholic thought has already achieved in Maritain's own "True Humanism" for instance. Fascism, Marxism and Nazism are simply regarded as different brands of totalitarianism throughout the manifesto and as the common enemy with which we are at war. Our present alliance with the Soviets is justified on the minimal grounds that the Russians are defending their homes from invasion and that therefore they are to be supported according to the obligations of international law. It is recognized that a Rusian victory would not impair our liberty of action in the same way as a Nazi victory, and that the residual Christian element in Russian life would be strengthened by our support of their war. But this is as far as the statement goes; and that is little enough, particularly when one reads it months after it was written and when one begins to hear plans for a Catholic-conservative

block to run from Spain to Poland after the war, which is designed to save Europe from Bolshevism.

Maritain and his associates do not recognize the distinction between communism as a Christian heresy and the anti-Christian doctrines of Nazism. The one believes in justice, liberty and peace, though it may have illusory methods of achieving them. The other proclaims, blood, race and war as normative.

Eduard Heimann.

A WEEK WITH GANDHI, *by Louis Fischer.* Duell Sloan and Pearce. $2.00.

Louis Fischer is a born hero worshipper. This book is the record of his reluctant worship of Gandhi. The worship is reluctant because Fischer is a modern social radical who does not really believe in Gandhi's solutions for social problems. Nevertheless he exalts Gandhi because he is the symbol of the struggle for Indian freedom.

Fischer's devotional attitude can not however completely suppress his critical appraisal of Gandhi's social obscurantism. Gandhi would like to turn his back on the whole of modern technical civilization. He thinks railroads are on the whole useless; and is not at all certain that if India should fail to achieve political unification it would be the worse for the potential anarchy into which it would be thrown by the lack of economic implements of social cohesion and the failure of political tools of communal life. It would be well for liberal Christians who have so long worshipped Gandhi as a second Christ, to understand more fully to what degree Gandhi expresses an essentially Hindu anti-historical mysticism, which depreciates all the vitalities and advances which men are able to achieve by the conquest of nature.

Fischer sometimes takes the position that Gandhi is the very incarnation of the Indian Congress. At other times he suggests that the western world need not worry too much about his social obscurantism, his opposition to medicine and technology, since the great man himself assured him that he would not try to force these obscurantist views upon the Congress.

Gandhi is undoubtedly a great man in some respects. But his attitude toward social problems is not unlike that of the peasants of 17th century Europe who tried to solve the problem of their increasing poverty by burning and destroying newly invented agricultural implements. Fischer does not recognize at all to what degree this attitude of Gandhi is a subtle form of compensation for an oriental sense of inferiority. Confronted by the technical achievements of the west, what is easier (and more futile) than for wise men of the east to call attention to the evils, which spring from western technological developments, and to obscure the evils which are derived from the orient's failure to embrace modern science? This kind of pride is natural enough; but it is rather foolish for westerners to accept it uncritically. It is always easy to repent of other people's sins. In a sense Gandhi, whatever the qualities of his saintliness, is kept fairly busy repenting of the sins of the west and condoning those of the east. His friend, the great poet Tagore, pointed out the dangers of this attitude many years ago.

R. N.

LIBERAL THEOLOGY, An Appraisal, Essays in Honor of Eugene W. Lyman. Scribners. $2.50.

Not many symposia have reached such a high level of excellence as this volume

dedicated to one of the most revered teachers of liberal theology, Professor Lyman. The various chapters are devoted to the exposition by liberal theology of the great doctrines of the Christian faith, dealing with Christ, the church, the Scriptures, human nature, religious knowledge and revelation, immortality, and to the history of liberal theology in its various aspects. The excellency of the chapters is of course no accident. Some of the best minds in the liberal church have contributed to the volume. The opening chapter by Walter Marshall Horton of the development of Prof. Lyman's thought is a masterpiece. It is the product of a spiritual son of Dr. Lyman and combines filial piety with scholarly exactness in tracing his thought and philosophical profundity in dealing with the relevant issues.

The general temper of the volume is to defend, reaffirm, reconstruct and reassess the main tenets of liberal theology in the light of world events and the criticisms which have been levelled against liberalism in recent decades. It is thus in its total impact an exposition of liberal evangelicalism, rather than liberalism. Professor Horton makes much of the fact that Prof. Lyman's own mind moved with the world events and the lessons which they taught in the last two decades. Only a few of the essays remain completely unaffected by the climate of theological thought in our own day. One of them, by Rufus Jones, expounds Christian mysticism without any thought of what criticism might be levelled against such mysticism from the standpoint of Biblical thought. The chapter is nevertheless a most rewarding one; for it explores the historical foundations of Christian mysticism with real insight.

Sometimes the essays make concessions to new current of thought without fully comprehending them. In several the idea of automatic progress is rejected on the supposition that only the fatalistic element in the idea of progress is under attack. Obviously the moralistic, as well as the fatalistic, element in the liberal interpretation of history is being challenged. There is undoubtedly progress in history. But the question is whether there is moral progress in any such sense as liberalism assumed in past centuries.

R. N.

PERSONAL RELIGION, *by Douglas Clyde Macintosh.* Charles Scribners. $3.00.

The title of this book was obviously chosen to distinguish it from Dr. Macintosh's previous volume "Social Religion." It is nevertheless a very comprehensive survey of the relation of religion to life, in which most of the social implications of the religious life are quite fully discussed, including the problem of war and pacifism. The volume is dedicated to the author's mother and to the late Henry B. Wright "who was for ten years my colleague in the Yale University Divinity School." The dedication is significant; for the book reveals to what degree Dr. Macintosh, who is one of the most eminent theologians of our day, was influenced in his personal religious life by the very warm evangelicalism of Henry B. Wright. There is in fact, an evangelical mood in this book which will reveal the author in a new light to those who have only known him through his various works on religious epistemalogy.

Dr. Macintosh's discussion of Wright's various methods of prayer and evangelism clarifies Frank Buchman's indebted-

ness to Wright, a debt which many have suspected but which may have never been fully acknowledged. Wright, for instance, coined the phrase of "two way prayer" which the Oxford groups later popularized. The idea is that we must not only pray to go God but expect guidance from God, primarily in terms of "hunches" which develop in our attitude of devotion. Dr. Macintosh's own recently developed sympathy for the Oxford groups is quite frankly expressed. He writes: "Particularly in connection with the church's desperate need to recapture the technique and the spirit of personal evangelism, the Oxford Group Movement is especially timely." He thinks the churches have erred in not showing a "more friendly and cooperative spirit" toward it. He does not discuss the sanctificationist and perfectionist illusions of Buchmanism, nor its error of assuming that it is possible for Christians to live by the four great standards of "absolute purity, absolute honesty, absolute unselfishness and absolute love." He thinks that it may rightly be criticised only for minor errors, primarily its undue emphasis upon public confessions. But the real fact is that basic error underlies Buchmanism; and from it springs the self-righteous fury of its devotees. It has too great a confidence in the possibility not only of knowing God's will but also in man's ability to do it. It is completely lacking in any contrite sense of the permanent contradiction between the human and the divine will.

It is worth mentioning this fact in a review of Dr. Macintosh's book because that is the primary difficulty with his own interpretation of the Christian faith, despite his much wider intellectual and moral grasp. This volume represents liberal Christianity at its best. But it also reveals its characteristic weakness. Dr. Macintosh has a good deal to say about the errors of Calvinism. In these strictures he expresses the conscience of a moral faith which is outraged by Calvin's conception of an arbitrary God; but he also expresses the illusions of a moralistic faith which has only a slight understanding for the ultimate problems which Calvin sought to answer.

If some of us find this general approach to the ultimate issues of life and faith a little too simple it is to be hoped that we will not commit the error of underestimating its great virtues, as it tends to underestimate the profundities of the more classical versions of Christianity.

R. N.

AGENDA OF POST-WAR WORLD, *by J. B. Condliffe,* Norton. $2.50.

The author discusses post-war problems, particularly economic ones with real insight. His chief interest is the reestablishment of free world trade, after the period of the economics of "autarchy" and the managed military economic practices of even the democratic nations, engaged in war. He is no blind devotee of international laissez-faire and understands that some international controls are necessary. But he believes that no international power will be wise or mighty enough to manage the complex economic interrelations of the world. For this reason they must be given a degree of freedom so that they will achieve certain automatic equilibria. He is particularly interested in analyzing the consequences of such a policy upon American economics. He sees no possibility of America relating itself mutually to the world if it insists upon exporting surplusses of both agricultural and industrial goods without allowing goods

to be imported. He knows that the dislocations of such a policy of free trade will be considerable; but he thinks that disturbances will be sectional rather than generally, and that the alternative policy will lead to new stagnation.

The author's thesis is a straw in the wind. The old liberal doctrines were once regarded as a panacea for all economic ills. Pure economic liberalism did not work and gradually gave way to various doctrines which insisted upon "managed" economics and the supremacy of political control over economic process. But the measure of truth which is to be found in classical liberalism is beginning to assert itself again. It is becoming apparent that in both domestic and international affairs a completely managed economic life would be analogous to a biological organism in which there are no automatic processes and in which every moment had to depend upon conscious will and control. Such an organism would perish of too much "head." We will have to learn to combine "management" with automatic processes. Some forms of social harmony must be achieved literally by "laissez-faire" by leaving things alone. Yet there must be overall planning; for automatic processes left to themselves quickly degenerate into conflicts and disproportions.

R. N.

THE PRINCIPLES OF POWER, *by Guglielmo Ferrero,* Putnams. $3.50.

The great Italian historian devoted the final years of his life to historical interpretation, rather than historical research. In his "Reconstruction of Europe" he speculated on the meaning of revolutionary and constructive statesmanship, using the Congress of Vienna as the basis of his speculations, and making Napoleon the symbol of the former, and Talleyrand the symbol of the latter type of statesmanship. In his final volume, published posthumously, he mediates upon principles of government, using the French revolution as the historical focus of his animadversions. While the book is hardly as important as the author seems to imagine (for he suggests that he is the first to penetrate into the mysteries of statecraft) it is nevertheless full of valuable insights.

Ferrero's main thesis is that there are two forms of legitimate government, the hereditary-monarchic and the democratic form. The mark of legitimacy is the uncoerced consent of the citizen, which is gained by the former government through tradition, habit and the personalization of authority in the figure of the sovereign; and by the latter through explicit forms of suffrage. Each form of legitimate government embodies some principles of the other form. Hereditary governments are democratic in the sense that they must rest upon uncoerced consent. Democratic governments must be traditional in the sense that without implicit acceptance of the idea of democracy, the form of democracy cannot maintain themselves. The only illegitimat government is one which rules by force and fraud.

Ferrero has some psychologically astute observations on the vicious circle of fear and terror in which tyrannical governments are involved. Governments which rule by terror, do so because they are in terror of revolt by the people, he declares.

Dr. Ferrero's treatment of the subject is a wholesome antidote to the confusion of those who imagine that all non-democratic governments are by definition tyrannical.

R. N.